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COMMENT
THE AFTERMATH OF WHDH: REGULATION BY
COMPETITION OR PROTECTION
OF MEDIOCRITY?
On January 22, 1969, the Federal Communications Commission
adopted a decision that will ultimately result in a major alteration of the
law governing the renewal of commercial radio and television broadcasting licenses. For the first time in its thirty-five year history, the
FCC refused to renew the license of a broadcaster who had an "average"
record of performance, and awarded the frequency to one of the parties
that had challenged the licensee. 1
The reaction of the industry and the communications bar was immediate. They persuaded the Commission to establish a "cut-off" date
for filing applications competing with renewal applications.' More
significantly, the National Association of Broadcasters initiated a
campaign among its membership for the passage of a bill by Congress
to prevent the FCC from considering competing applications when acting on the renewal application of a licensee.3 The lobbying campaign
1WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C2d 1 (1969), appeals docketed, No. 23514, D.C. Cir.,
June2 16, 1969, No. 23159, D.C. Cir. June 17, 1969.
In re Amendment of §§ 1.580, 1.227, 1.516, 1.571 and 1.591 of FCC Rules, 34
Fed. Reg. 7964, 16 P & F RADIO RE. 2d 1512 (1969).
The amendment of the Commission's rules established a "cut-off" date 30 days
prior to the expiration date of the renewal applicant's license. Both competing applications and petitions to deny must be filed before the "cut-off" date. This not only
permits the Commission's staff to continue its statutorily-permitted practice of
granting renewals within the month preceding the expiration date but also eliminates
the possibility of filing competing applications after a renewal application has been
deferred for further investigation. Lengthy deferrals may indicate that the Commission has uncovered evidence of unsatisfactory past performance or is skeptical of the
renewal applicant's future performance. Competing applicants would prefer to file
against such licensees and were able to do so prior to the amendment of the FCC's
rules. For example, a competing application was filed against KNBC-TV, NBC's
wholly-owned station in Los Angeles, two months after KNBC's license expired
because the Commission had deferred the renewal pending further consideration of
incidents involving certain NBC shows and KNBC news coverage.
The pressure exerted by the industry on the Commission is evidenced by the fact
that the Commission adopted the cut-off rule only two months after it was proposed.
See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C2d 858 (1969). Also, the industry
convinced the FCC to increase the amount of time between the cut-off date and the
expiration date from the proposed 15 to 30 days prior to the license expiration date.
3 The bill proposed by the NAB provides for the amendment of § 309(a) of the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1964), by adding the following
language:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Act, the Commission, in acting
upon any application for renewal of license filed under section 308, may not
consider the application of any other person for the facilities for which
renewal is sought. If the Commission finds that the public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby, it shall grant the renewal
application. If the Commission determines after hearing that a grant of
the application of a renewal applicant would not be in the public interest,
convenience, and necessity, it may deny such application, and applications for
construction permits by other parties may then be accepted, pursuant to sec(368)
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was so effective that by the time that the Commission acted on the
requests for rehearing by the parties in WHDH,4 over fifty separate,
but virtually identical bills, had been introduced into the House of
Representatives by over fifty-five Congressmen.5 On the Senate side
of the Capitol, Senator Pastore, Chairman of the Communications Subcommittee and the most influential member of either house in broadcasting matters, introduced a slightly modified version of the bill 6 "to
remove the sword of Damocles from over the heads of licensees at renewal time." 7
Events since the initial decision in WHDH have shown that the
industry's concern over the sudden shift in regulatory policy is wellfounded. For example, a hearing examiner recommended that a major
Los Angeles television station's renewal be denied and that the license
be awarded to a competing applicant. 8 No fewer than three other major
stations in the largest markets in the country have been challenged by'
competing applicants: KNBC-TV, Los Angeles; WPIX-TV, New
York City; and WNAC-TV, BostonY Furthermore, the renewals of
two newspaper-owned television stations have been designated for
hearing.Y0 In addition, the Justice Department settled its first antitrust
suit against a newspaper-television combination " by requiring the detion 308, for the broadcast service previously licensed to the renewal applicant
whose renewal was denied.
See, e.g., H.R. 11376, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (introduced by Rep. Purcell).
4 WHDH, Inc., 17 F.C.C2d 856 (adopted May 19, 1969).
5 115 CONG. REc. H 2591-H 3754 passin (daily eds. April 14 to May 15, 1969).
6 S. 2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). For the text of the bill see text accompanying note 114 infra.
7 115 CONG. REc. S 4228 (daily ed. April 29, 1969).
8 RKO General, Inc. (KHJ-TV), 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1181 (1969) (initial
decision of Hearing Examiner Thomas H. Donahue).
9 These three stations exemplify the types of stations most vulnerable to attack
by competing applicants. All three are in the lucrative top ten markets and all are
VHF outlets. KNBC-TV, owned and operated by the NBC network, is undoubtedly
one of the most profitable outlets in the country. According to FCC statistics, the
15 television stations owned and operated by the networks earned over a quarter of the
aggregate net income of all the 486 VHF stations operating in 1967. 34 FCC AN1N.
REP. 122 (1968). As KNBC is in the second largest market in the country, it earns
considerably more than even the average network owned-and-operated station.
WPIX-TV, owned by the New York Daily News, although not the most profitable
station in the New York market, has a tremendous business potential, since it is one
of the six VHF stations in the most lucrative market in the country and has greater
coverage than any other station in the market.
In addition to network- and newspaper-owned stations, stations owned by conglomerates such as RKO General's Boston station, WNAC-TV, are also vulnerable.
RKO General is a wholly owned subsidiary of General Tire & Rubber Company.
Although perhaps not as profitable as a New York or Los Angeles station,
WNAC-TV is particularly vulnerable to renewal denial because of evidence of
certain anticompetitive trade practices between General Tire and its subsidiaries on the
one hand and General Tire's suppliers and purchasers on the other. RKO General, Inc.
(KHJ-TV), 16 P & F RADIO REG. 1181, 1241-60 (1969) (initial decision of Hearing
Examiner Thomas H. Donahue).
1o Midwest Radio-Television, Inc. (WCCO & WCCO-TV), 16 F.C.C2d 943
(1969); Chronicle Broadcasting Co. (KRON-FM & TV), 16 F.C.C2d 882 (1969).
11 The defendant, Gannett Company, agreed to sell its Rockford, Illinois television
station to meet the Justice Department's demands. Gannett owns the two newspapers
in Rockford. BROADCASTING, Sept. 1, 1969, at 9.
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fendant to divest itself of the station, further indicating its concern
about the concentration of control of the media."
These developments have created a state of confusion and flux. On
the one hand, Congressmen under the pressure of powerful broadcasting interests in their constituencies are pushing for prompt passage
of legislation to curtail the FCC's power to deny renewal. On the
other, reformers hail the Commission's belated realization that a license
is not a perpetual property right.' 3 Meanwhile, hearing examiners must
prepare to preside over comparative hearings between original and renewal applicants for which the FCC has provided them with few
guidelines. The situation calls for an evaluation to ascertain which of
the principal proposals for reform of the license renewal process would
best serve the public.
To begin such an evaluation, it will first be necessary to describe
the inadequacies of present license renewal proceedings. The second
step will be an analysis of the law relating to the standards applicable
to comparative hearings in renewal proceedings, of the impact of the
WHDH decision, and of its potential for injecting a much needed
element of competition into the renewal process. Current legislation to
overrule WHDH will then be examined, and finally, a proposal will be
offered to minimize the danger which this legislation is intended to
remove-insecurity of investment in the broadcasting industry.
I. THE RENEWAL PROBLEM
The Communications Act of 1934 limits broadcasting licenses to
terms of three years and provides for subsequent renewals for similar
periods "if the Commission finds that public interest, convenience, and
necessity would be served thereby." 14 Although the portion of the Act
which deals specifically with broadcast licenses is relatively short, it
contains two explicit statements that the licenses granted confer no
rights on the licensees beyond the terms and conditions of the license,-"
and two explicit mandates that renewal be contingent upon the Commission's finding that the public interest would be served by the grant.-6
That license renewal was not intended by Congress to be automatic is amply demonstrated by the fact that the provisions relating to
renewal in the Communications Act were adopted with only minor
alteration from the Radio Act of 1927. Under that Act the Federal
12See Comments of the United States Department of Justice (brief submitted
in rulemaking), In re Amendment of §§ 73.35, 73.240, and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and Television Broadcast
Stations, No. 18110 (F.C.C., proposed March 28, 1968) proposing that licensees with
more than one broadcast license or a newspaper in a market be required to divest
themselves of all but one of their media interests.
ISSee, e.g., Shayon, Who Will Cry Havoc?, SATURDAY RVIE'w, June 28. 1969,
at 22.
1447 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964).
15 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 309(h) (1964) ; cf. 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1964).
1647 U.S.C. §§307(d), 309(a) (1964).

THE AFTERMATH OF WHDH

Radio Commission (FRC) in one year alone threatened to deny renewal of 164 station licenses, and eventually denied 62 of them.' 7 Despite the FRC's aggressive posture in renewal proceedings, the congressional reports expressed concern about the danger of its losing
control over the valuable privileges conferred.:'
The FCC's behavior has been very different from that of its predecessor. Despite the statutory mandate, its practice, particularly in
the past two decades, has been to grant renewals automatically unless
there is substantial evidence of misrepresentation to the Commission,
falsification of program logs, obscene programming, sponsorship of unlawful lotteries or other clear violations of the Commission's rules. 9
In fact, for a quarter of a century, the FCC granted all applications for
renewal except in the case of technical defects or misrepresentations to
the Commission. Although the Commission since 1961 has been more
prone to penalize miscreants, license renewals are essentially automatic
in the absence of gross misconduct or flagrant violation of a clear
FCC rule.2 1
A. The Mechanics of Renewal
The initial responsibility for the grant of a license renewal has been
delegated to the Chief of the Commission's Broadcast Bureau.22 In
practice, the Chief grants all renewal applications which comply with
the statute, regulations, and Commission policy, and which do not conflict with any other application, or against which no petition to deny
has been filed. All but an extremely small fraction of renewal applications are granted without any review by the Commission or any of
172 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 16 (1928).
ISSee S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong.,

1st Sess. (1933), reprinted in P & F

RADIO

REG. (Current Service) 110:1004, at 10:227 (suggesting that license terms be
shortened to maintain control over the license privileges) ; H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d
10:1019,
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), reprinted in P & F RADIO REG. (Current Service) 11
at 10:264 (renewal grants should be made pursuant to the same considerations as
initial grants). The latter proposal was incorporated into the original Act, but
was amended in 1952 because Congress deemed the considerations applicable to the
two types of grants to be somewhat different. Both the legislative history and the
Commission interpretation of the statute as amended demonstrate that the 1952 amendment did not restrict the Commission's power to deny license renewals. See KSTP,
Inc. 9(KOB), 22 P & F RADIO REG. 35 (1961).

1 JONES, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (1962), reprinted in Hearings on the Federal Communi-

cations Commission, Part I, Before Subcomm. No. 6 of House Select Comm. on Small

Business, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., A87, A152 (1966) [hereinafter cited as JONES].
20 Cox, Does the FCC Really Do Anything? 11 J. BROADCASTING 97, 104 (1967).
21 The following table shows the number of renewal applications for radio and
television stations set for hearing by the FCC in each fiscal year:
16
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Most of the applications were designated for hearing because of evidence of misrepresentation. FCC ANN. REP. (1958-1968).
247 C.F.R. § 0.281(a) (1) (1969).
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its members.2 3 The processing, analysis, and investigation of the
roughly 2,400 renewal applications received annually ' is the responsibility of the Renewal Branch, which consists of six lawyers, five
broadcast analysts, three engineers, and two accountants, plus a clerical
Each application is reviewed initially by an accountant, a
staff.2
broadcast analyst, and an engineer, who are primarily concerned with
the financial status of the licensee, possible legal or character issues, the
actual and proposed programming, and defects in transmission. Letters
of inquiry are sent to those stations which have submitted applications
which are incomplete, defective, or require further elaboration. At
the initial processing stage, a report on a licensee's shortcomings from
the Complaints and Compliance Division may also be considered, to
determine if further investigation is required. Usually, the Complaints
Division report enumerates the complaints filed by a station's listeners
with the Commission and the station's response to any complaint
forwarded to the licensee by the Commission. If an investigation
is warranted or if the renewal applicant has not satisfactorily answered
an inquiry, his renewal may be deferred and not renewed prior to the
expiration date of the previous license.2 6 But deferral does not necessarily imply that the renewal is in jeopardy. Generally, deferred status
merely indicates a minor, usually technical, defect in the application."
The officials who process renewal applications do not suffer from
any dearth of information. The renewal application " itself requires the
applicant to divulge a substantial amount of information about the operation of his station. The applicant must disclose his financial situation
and the businesses and/or stations in which the applicant and its officers, directors, and principal shareholders have an interest. But most
revealing is section IV of the application-the "Statement of Program
Service." In this section, the applicant must relate his methods of
23

The Commissioners themselves play almost literally no role at all. We
simply note that the staff has completed its processing of the applications,
doing little more than nod to the sketchy memoranda as they pass our desks.
Broadcasting in America and the FCC's License Renewal Process: An Oklahoma
Case Study-A statement by Commissioners Kenneth A. Cox and Nicholas Johnson
on the occasion of the FCC's renewal of the licenses of Oklahoma broadcasters for
a 3-year term beginning June 1, 1968, 14 F.C.C2d 1, 9 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Oklahoma Study].
24According to FCC regulations, all broadcast licenses in a region (usually two
or three states) expire on the same date. A schedule has been established whereby
every two months a different region's licenses expire, so that each year approximately
one-third of all the broadcast licenses are up for renewal. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.34, 73218,
73.630 (1969).
25 Inside the FCC: The Renewal Branch, TmEvisiox AGE, August 25, 1969, at 72.
2

6JoNEs at A151-53.

27

Joint Comments of KFMB (AM) -FM-TV (Brief submitted by Covington &
Burling) at 6-7, In re Amendment of §§ 1.227, 1.516, 1.571 and 1.591 of FCC Rules,
34 Fed. Reg. 3694, 16 P & F RADio REG. 2d 1512 (1969) (Docket No. 18495).
28 FCC Form 303 (adopted Sept. 1967).
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ascertaining the community's needs and interests,2" the needs and interests he believes his station will serve in the future, the typical programs that he plans to broadcast in the next license period, and the procedures he has for the consideration of complaints from the public. Past
programming is described by detailing the programming of a "composite week"-seven days throughout the year which are designated by
the Commission."° The applicant must report the amount of time devoted to news, public affairs, and other non-entertainment programming,
as well as the sources of the programming for the week-local, network,
or recorded-and the number of public service announcements broadcast in the composite week. 3' In addition, more general inquiries are
made concerning the programming broadcast to serve the interests and
needs of the community, the size of the news staff, and the applicant's
policy with respect to appropriation of time for the discussion of
public issues.
The applicant is then asked to classify a typical week of his proposed programming by program types and sources, and to indicate
changes in programming or policy from the prior license period. He
must also indicate the amount of commercial matter per hour in the
composite week for the past, and the maximum amount he proposes for
the future. Obviously, the Commission requires the applicant to divulge
29 Since Suburban Broadcasters, 30 F.C.C. 1021 (1961), the Commission has
required that applicants provide complete information about their awareness of the
interests and needs of the community they serve and their efforts to meet those needs
and interests. In Public Notice Relating to Ascertainment of Community Needs By
Broadcast Applicants (FCC 68-847), 33 Fed. Reg. 12113, 13 P & F RADIO REG. 2d
1903 (1968), the Commission enumerated four elements that it seeks in answers to
part I of section IV of the application:
a) Ascertainment of community needs by consultations with community leaders,
b) A listing of the significant suggestions as to community needs received from
consultation with community leaders.
c) The applicant's evaluation of the relative importance of those suggestions as
to community needs and his consideration of them in formulating the station's overall
program service.
d) Relating the program services to the needs of the community as evaluated-a
showing in the application of "what program service is proposed to meet what needs."
See City of Camden, 18 F.C.C.2d 412, 418-22 (1969). It is important to note that
the Commission's emphasis is not on audience programming preferences, but on the
problems and issues within the community. Broadcasting Service of Carolina, Inc.,
16 F.C.C.2d 591 (1969).
30 See, e.g., Public Notice 34980, (FCC 69-856), 34 Fed. Reg. 13048 (1969) ; Public Notice 20961 (FCC 68-831), 33 Fed. Reg. 11863 (1968).
31 The following are brief definitions of the principal program types and sources:
a) News-reports dealing with current local, national and international events;
b) Public affairs-talks, commentaries, documentaries and similar programs concerning local, national and international affairs;
c) Non-entertainment-used in this Comment to refer to all programming except
entertainment and sports;
d) Local-any program originated or produced by the station in which local
talent is employed;
e) Network-programs furnished by a network;
f) Recorded-syndicated, taped or transcribed programs and feature films;
g) Public service announcement-any announcement for which no charge is made
and which promotes activities or services of a governmental or nonprofit organization.
See FCC Form 303, section IV-B, at i-u.
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more information than can possibly be entered on the ten-page form.
The answers supplied on the form merely refer the reader to the
multitude of exhibits which are invariably attached. Renewal applications, especially for television licenses, are voluminous compilations in
which substance is often lost in a deluge of trivia.32
B. The Ineffectiveness of the Renewal Process
The irony of this application procedure, with its elaborate apparatus for gathering and evaluating information, is that in the absence
of major complaints, rule violations, or gross misconduct, the renewal
will be granted,33 unless a petition to deny or a conflicting application
has been filed with the Commission. 4 Applications which show an
inadequate survey of community interests or which propose a high
concentration of commercialization '5 may be deferred and investigated,
but the chances of adverse Commission action are slight and the
prospects of denying renewal virtually nil. In some areas, notably
programming, the Commission has essentially abdicated its responsibility to direct its staff. Although the Commission requires the staff
to submit reports on those stations that propose less than five percent
news, one percent public affairs, and five percent non-entertainment
32 For example, there seems to be a tendency for applicants to submit extremely
long lists of community leaders interviewed without an in-depth analysis of the opinions
expressed in the interviews and, usually, with little apparent effect on the station's
programming. Meritorious programming is often described in several different sections
of the application. Perhaps this is the result of the size of the application: applicants
fear that the FCC staff will overlook the instances of outstanding performance buried
in the application, and therefore refer to them at every opportunity.
3

I think that what has happened is that, as the majority of the Commission
has become more permissive--in part because of their great concern about the
first amendment, censorship, and intervention in programming-that the feeling
has gotten around that the Commission isn't going to do anything about your
license renewal unless you violate a clear rule, or you cheat somebody, or you
lie to the agency, or something like that.
Hearingson Review of Policy Matters of Federal Communications Commission Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 1, at 122 (1969) (testimony of Commissioner Cox).
34 The Commission itself must act upon a petition to deny, although a hearing is
not required if no substantial or material questions of fact are raised by the petition.
47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (2) (1964). Mutually exclusive applications require that a comparative hearing be held. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945);
KSTP, Inc. (KOB), 22 P & F RADIo REG. 35 (1961).
35 The Commission has established general guidelines with regard to these matters.
See note 29 supra; Public Notice, Statements of Proposed Commercial Practices (FCC
66-923), 31 Fed. Reg. 13875 (1966) (which required applicants who proposed more
than 18 minutes of advertising per hour for radio or more than 16 minutes per hour
for television to state the basis on which they concluded that such practices "would be
consonant with the needs and interests of the community which the licensee serves").
The Commission appears to be increasingly concerned that broadcasters at least
follow the procedures of the Suburban Broadcasters rule, cf. City of Camden, 18
F.C.C2d 412, 418-22 (1969) ; Broadcasting Service of Carolina, Inc., 16 F.C.C2d 591
(1969), but it is obvious from all recent studies that many licensees give little, if any,
consideration to the community survey in formulating their programming. And overcommercialization has not precluded renewal. E.g., Accomack-Northampton Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C2d 357 (1967) (the applicant proposed as much as 33 minutes of
commercial matter per hour).
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programming, the staff regularly renews the licenses of many stations
with proposals for considerably less program time in one or more of
these classifications. 36
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the typical licensee's programming and policies are unaffected by the periodic ritual of renewal.
There is considerable evidence that many renewal applicants attempt to
present past and proposed programming which meets the minimdi
guidelines followed by the FCC staff in processing renewal applica38
tions 37 and which is geared to the predilections of the Commission.
This practice is certainly understandable in view of the enormous value
of the broadcast franchises and the total absence of any concrete Commission formulations fixing the minimal quantity of non-entertainment
programming and the maximum quantity of commercialization.39 The

36 The refusal of the majority of the Commission to direct its staff to ask the
broadcasters for their reasons for such low amounts of news, public affairs or nonentertainment programming has prompted Commissioners Cox and Johnson to issue
bimonthly dissents. See, e.g., Renewal of Radio and Television Licenses in New
York and New Jersey, 18 F.C.C2d 268, 322 (1969); Oklahoma Case Study, 14
F.C.C.2d 1, 126 (1968); Renewal of Standard Broadcast and Television Licenses,
11 F.C.C.2d 809, 810 (1968). The Commission has found a proposal providing for
no news or public affairs programming to be in the public interest. Herman C. Hall,
11 F.C.C2d 344 (1968).
37

The review of renewal applications does proceed against standards. They
are assumed standards with a heritage of uniformity dictated only by tradition.
What are the traditional standards? These are difficult to ascertain.
There is no form book or check list which encompasses them. Regulating the
most technologically advanced form of communication yet devised by man is
a body of imperatives which have survived through man's most primitive form
of communication-the oral tradition. Difficult to characterize, these standards are neither rule nor regulation. They are more in the nature of mores.
STAFF OF SUBCOanM. ON COMMUNICATIONS

OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 90THr

CONG., 2D SEss., FAnESS DOCTRNE 78 (Comm. Print 1968).
3s JoNEs at A171-72. Processing the application for renewal also allows the
Commission to compare the applicant's past promises with his past performance. Gross
disparity between his past promises and performance may be grounds for a hearing,
cf. Fisher Broadcasting Co., 30 F.C.C. 177 (1961), or disciplinary action. KORD,
Inc., 31 F.C.C. 85 (1961).
Since previous promises, especially if contained in an original application, were
attuned to the desires of the Commission in order to facilitate processing or to gain
an advantage in a comparative hearing, requiring conformity with past promises
exerts an influence on the licensee to follow the predilections of the Commission. At
the same time, however, it introduces an element of rigidity into the system by making
it less likely that broadcasters will change with the changing conditions of their
communities. JONES at A171-72. Commissioner Cox has observed, however, that
many broadcasters' programming proposals decline over the years from the proposals
approved in the original licensing proceeding. The FCC's Role in Television Programming Regulation: A Symposium, 14 VILL. L. REv. 581, 639 (1969).
39 The history of the FCC's attitude toward overcommercialization at renewal
time demonstrates how quickly administrative policy can change. Although in the
1940's the Commission had designated several renewal applications for hearing because
of e.xcessive commercialization (80-90% of total broadcast time), all were renewed
on the basis of promises to improve. In 1963, Chairman Minnow began his campaign
to curb overcommercialization, culminating in a proposed rulemaking to adopt the
standards of the NAB Code. Under intense pressure from the NAB and Congress,
the Commission decided that the adoption of the rule would be inappropriate but
asserted its intention to examine commercialization on a case-by-case basis. The
Commission was so deadlocked that it was unable to pursue its policy for almost
two years. Suddenly, in a three-month period, the Commission ended its vacillation
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avoidance of a letter of inquiry, deferral status, and possibly an investigation is worth enough to the typical licensee that he is willing to
conform his programming and station operations to what he and his
counsel feel the Commission desires. Thus, most of the regulation of
renewal applicants is not overt but is what has been described as "regulation by the lifted eyebrow." 4
While many broadcasters, if not the overwhelming majority,
make a conscious effort to remain in the good graces of the Commission,
many licensees have taken advantage of the Commission's reluctance
to establish mandatory guidelines in areas such as programming. In
the case of KHJ-TV, RKO General's 4 station in Los Angeles, the
record showed that the licensee had received renewals despite a programming format devoted almost exclusively to old movies and frequent
commercials. In his conclusion, the hearing examiner observed:
Why [General Tire] chose to thus operate the station is of
course a question that is locked in the breast of General Tire's
management. A good guess would be that with a myopic
eye on the dollar it decided "formula broadcasting" would
"get by" because the station would never be called to account.4 2
If that was the rationale behind the policy that has brought
the station to the brink of loss of license, about the kindest
thing that can be said of it is that it evinced considerable
43
naivete concerning the stability of regulatory policy.
Of course, KHJ-TV is an exceptional case. Its inadequacies were
probably apparent in the renewal application itself.
and granted 11 stations short-term renewals for substantial disparities between proposed commercial practices and performance. Ramey, The Federal Communications
Commission and Broadcast Advertising: An Analytical Review, 20 FED. Comm. B.J.
71, 85-109 (1966).
4o0Miami Broadcasting Co. (WQAM), 14 P & F RAio REG. 125, 128 (1956)
(dissenting opinion of Commissioner Doerfer).
41 RKO General, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Tire and Rubber Company, owns an AM, an FM, and a TV station in each of 3 of the top 5 markets in
the country.
42

The formula referred to is as old as time. There have been many
practitioners of it, including Phineas T. Barnum and Texas Guinan. One of
its most colorful exponents was the western "medicine man". He rolled into
a frontier town, bought a round of drinks for the boys at the bar, gave the
Sheriff a couple of cigars, called out Little Sheba and went into his pitch
selling his own particular brand of snake oil. Modem broadcast counterpart
would call for these changes in casting and properties: Boys at the Bar . . .
the so-called "Discriminating Audience"; the drinks . . . news, information
and some quality entertainment; The Sheriff . . . The Commission; the

cigars . . . the station's nod to the Commission's reporting requirements and
program policies. Only nominal changes need be made for Little Sheba and
the pitch of the medicine man.
RKO General, Inc. (KHJ-TV), 16 P & F RADIo REG. 1181, 1267 n.3 (1969) (initial
decision of Hearing Examiner Thomas H. Donahue) (footnote in original).
43Id. at 1267-68.
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However, in many cases the failure of the licensee to serve the
public is not readily apparent from the application since he scrupulously
follows the ritual while, in fact, violating the spirit of commission and
statutory policy. In such cases, an evidentiary hearing in which
representatives of groups in the licensee's community can participate
fully is a useful tool in determining the broadcaster's devotion to the
public interest.4 4 The statute requires such hearings when the Commission is unable to make a finding that a grant of the application
would be in the public interest or when there is a material and substantial question of fact.45 In practice, however, the Commission has
granted renewals without a hearing even where listener complaints or
community group petitions to deny have raised serious questions of
fact. 41 Even when hearings have been held, those attacking the renewal
have traditionally been accorded hostile treatment by both the hearing
examiners and the Commission. This attitude on the part of the
Commission led Judge Burger to write one of the most scathing
opinions ever delivered against a federal agency:
The record now before us leaves us with a profound concern over the entire handling of this case following the remand to the Commission. The impatience with the Public
Intervenors, the hostility toward their efforts to satisfy a
surprisingly strict standard of proof, plain errors in rulings
and findings lead us, albeit reluctantly, to the conclusion that
it will serve no useful purpose to ask the Commission to reconsider the Examiner's actions and its own Decision and
Order under a correct allocation of the burden of proof. The
administrative conduct reflected in this record is beyond
repair.47
Competing applicants for licenses held by renewal applicants have
been accorded a comparative hearing with the renewal applicant as a
matter of right. However, the only decided cases 4 give the existing
44

Unless the Commission is to be given staff and resources to perform the
enormously complex and prohibitively expensive task of maintaining constant
surveillance over every licensee, some mechanism must be developed so that
the legitimate interests of listeners can be made a part of the record which
the Commission evaluates.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F2d 994, 1005
(D.C. Cir. 1966).
45 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964).
4 See, e.g., Petition for Reconsideration of Ethel C. Hale and W. Paul Wharton
(License Renewal of KSL), 16 F.C.C2d 340 (1969), appeal docketed, No. 22751,
D.C. Cir., May 15, 1969; Lamar Life Broadcasting Co. (WLBT), 38 F.C.C. 1143
(1965), rev'd sub nort. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); cf. Joseph v. FCC, 404 F2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
47 Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, No. 19,409,
at 12-13 (D.C. Cir., June 20, 1969).
48Wabash Valley Broadcasting Corp. (WTHI-TV), 35 F.C.C. 677 (1963);
Hearst, Inc. (WBAL), 15 F.C.C. 1149 (1951); cf. C. Bruce McConnell, 6 F.C.C.
167 (1938).
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licensee such an overwhelming advantage, because of the mere fact that
he is the existing licensee, that potential challengers have been deterred
from filing competing applications.
It is thus clear that the FCC has consistently demonstrated a bias
in favor of renewal applicants. Perhaps this is due in some degree to
the past failure of the Commission to entertain the complaints and
evidence of listener groups as well as to the insufficiency of the Commission's investigative staff. Without evidence of a licensee's failure
to serve his community, it may seem unreasonably harsh to the Commission to force him through a long and expensive hearing. But probably the most important reason for the Commission's protective attitude
is the severity to the license holders of denying renewal. There is, of
course, a range of penalties less severe than revocation or denial to
which the Commission can resort: money forfeitures, cease and desist
orders, and short-term renewals. 9 The latter has been used by the
Commission in situations where it has deemed normal three-year renewal not to be in the public interest. Sometimes, as in WLBT, this
remedy is employed to give the licensee a probationary period to improve his operation.5" At other times, grant of a short-term renewal
has been conditioned on the sale of the station within the license term,
thereby permitting the broadcaster to recover a tremendous profit on
the sale of his license.5 1 However, none of these lesser sanctions is
very effective, especially against gross misconduct, since all of them
either leave the licensee in possession of his license,5" or allow him to
make a full profit on the sale of the station.
A further possible reason for the Commission's reluctance to deny
renewal is that it may also harm the community as well as the licensee
who serves it. A station in a small market with correctable deficiencies
may be better than none at all. Furthermore, without a competing
application against which to compare the licensee's performance, it is
often difficult to determine whether another licensee could be found
4947 U.S.C. §§ 503(b) (1), 312(b), 307(d) (1964).
ISee, e.g., Lamar Life Broadcasting Co. (WLBT), 38 F.C.C. 1143 (1965),
rev'd sub norn. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359
F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966); KORD, Inc., 31 F.C.C. 85 (1961).
51 Melody Music, Inc. (WGMA), 2 F.C.C.2d 958 (1966); cf. National Broadcasting Co., 37 F.C.C. 427 (1964).
Professor Jaffe feels that the Commission should consider more frequent use of
of this remedy, especially in situations in which the licensee initially purchased the
license. He admits, however, that such action may be contrary to the statutory
scheme, which requires the Commission to make a determination that renewal would
be in the public interest, since the primary reason for the special renewal is to allow
a broadcaster who has been deemed unqualified to recover his investment in the
intangible assets of the station. Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License
Renewals, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1693, 1699-1700 (1969).
52 A recent decision demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the short-term probationary renewal as a penalty. The Commission found that a licensee operating under
a one-year license had fraudulently deceived its advertisers with respect to promotional contests and broadcast times of advertisements. Nevertheless the licensee was
granted a six-month renewal. Star Stations of Indiana, Inc., 17 P & F RADio RIG. 2d

491 (1969).
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who would perform better.5 3 Today, however, these considerations are
applicable only in the smaller markets and to certain types of stations
(UHF and FM, for instance) in the larger markets. The value of a
broadcasting license, especially a VHF license, in the top fifty markets
is so great that the Commission could be reasonably certain that a suitable applicant would apply were renewal denied."
The most severe effects of denial of a renewal application would
be felt by the broadcasting industry, which has come to rely on automatic renewal. The entire industry is built on investments that cannot
be recovered in the initial three years of operation. The licensees which
pioneered FM radio, UHF, and color television would not have done so
if they had not been certain of renewal. Most stations contract for
programming years in advance and secure their best personnel through
long-term contracts."' The enormous sums paid for licensed stations
over and above the replacement value of the station's property are
ample testimony to the reliance placed on automatic renewal. 6 These
sums represent the potential profit of the station over a period of years
which includes several license terms.
Thus, the situation which has developed is something less than
satisfactory. The statutory mandate is honored more in its breach than
its observance; effective surveillance of broadcast stations is inhibited
by the insufficiency of the staff and by the Commission's hostility to
local groups and competing applicants; licensees lack incentive to improve their programming and public service above the minimal levels
sufficient to avoid minor inquiries and deferral status; and the FCC
is unable to depart from its prior practice without serious economic
dislocations and opposition from the industry, the public, and the
Congress. The result is mediocre and, occasionally, just plain bad
programming which gives a nod to the FCC and the public, but bows
low to the advertiser's dollar.

II. THE POLICY OF WHDH
A. WHDH: A Break With Precedent
If WHDH revolutionizes communications law, it will be because
the policy it enunciated is applicable far beyond the unique facts of the
case. The dramatic result--denial of a renewal application-accentu63 For instance, an FM licensee will probably contend that an FM station cannot

be operated in the market unless it is affiliated with an AM or TV station. Deter-

mining whether that contention is true may require an extensive analysis of the market.
54
In the WHDH case itself, two entirely new applicants filed, both of which were
qualified, after the FCC virtually invited applicants to contest WHDH's renewal.
55 Transript of Proceedings, vol. 1, at 24-30, Hearings on S2004 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications, of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969) (testimony of Frank P. Fogarty) [hereinafter cited as S.2004 Hearings].
56 In 1967, a Houston television station was sold for $21.5 million, only 4.5 million
of which represented the replacement cost of property and equipment. In 1964, a
Pittsburgh television station was sold for $20.5 million. $16.6 million above the replacement value of the property. S.2004 Hearings, at 390-91.
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ates the general resolve of the Commission, or at least certain of its
members, to break with the precedents governing comparative hearings
in which a renewal applicant is a party.
Prior to WHDH, the Commission followed the policy established
by Hearst Radio, Inc. (WBAL) 57 and Wabash Valley Broadcasting
Corp.55 In 1946, Hearst, the licensee of a standard broadcast station
in Baltimore was challenged by the competing application of Public
Service Radio Corporation. Five years later, the Commission granted
the renewal in a three-two decision. The Commission stated that the
determining factor was
the clear advantage of continuing the established and excellent
service now furnished by WBAL and which we find to be
in the public interest, when compared to the risks attendant
on the execution of the proposed programming of Public
Service Radio Corporation, excellent though the proposal
may be.59

This conclusion is incredible in view of the majority's finding that prior
to the designation of the case for hearing, WBAL's programming had
been overcommercialized with few programs on local activities. The
"established and excellent service" to which the majority refers was
due to WBAL's improvement in the period between the designation for
hearing and the Commission's decision. Despite the licensee's dubious
record, the majority also awarded it a preference 6 o for program proposal, and refused to give the challenger a preference for its greater
integration of ownership and management, because of the greater probability that Hearst would effectuate its proposals. Similarly, although
WBAL was owned by a nation-wide newspaper chain, the majority referred to WBAL's past record as grounds for denying the locallyowned challenger a preference for local ownership. Diversification of
ownership-Hearst owned one of the two daily Baltimore papers-was
likewise considered not to be a controlling element in view of the
licensee's record.
In dissent, Chairman Coy recognized the fact that the manner in
which a renewal applicant operated his station must be given significant
weight, but considered WBAL's record not sufficiently satisfactory to
warrant the inference that it would effectuate its proposals. Both dissenting Commissioners viewed the statutory scheme as providing for
competition between a licensee and other applicants at renewal time
and thought that the possibility of such competition was the chief
incentive for licensees to operate in the public interest.
F.C.C. 1149 (1951).
5835 F.C.C. 677 (1963).
59 15 F.C.C. at 1183.
6715

0o The word "preference" is a term of art indicating one party's superiority over
other competitors on a criterion. The term "demerit" is used to signify that a party
has not made a satisfactory showing on one criterion.
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The challenger in Wabash Valley, unlike his counterpart in Hearst,
entered the comparative hearing with an outstanding record as an AM
radio licensee, but it was made in a different community than the one
in which the television station he sought was located. Although the
Commission awarded Livesay, the challenger, a preference over Wabash
in a comparison of their respective AM radio operations, the majority
gave Wabash a preference on the overall criterion of past broadcast
record because of Wabash's record both in the television medium and
in the city in question. Having determined that Wabash had proven
itself in the medium and the service area, the majority could logically
conclude that the element of risk inherent in substituting Livesay for
Wabash outweighed Livesay's preferences on the integration and diversification criteria.
The majority's decision on its face appears considerably more
well-reasoned than Hearst. However, Chairman Henry in dissent
noted that the programming of Wabash had not been critically
analyzed in the comparative hearing since Livesay had tactical reasons
for refraining from vigorously attacking Wabash: Livesay hoped that
Wabash would be granted a construction permit for another channel
in the city thereby leaving Livesay as the sole applicant for the license
that Wabash then possessed. Livesay therefore permitted Wabash to
substitute its own specially-selected composite week for the FCCdesignated composite week which would have reflected the mediocre
character of its performance. It is not clear from the opinion whether
the majority took into account the fact that Wabash's true record was
different from the one presented. But Chairman Henry recognized
the implications of the Commission's decision:
I particularly regret the fact that the majority's decision
in this case may hereafter be construed by potential applicants
for the same broadcast facilities (or for mutually prohibitive
facilities) as those now being used by existing operators so
as to discourage such persons from filing applications when
the present licenses come up for renewal. These persons
should certainly file applications if they believe that they can
demonstrate that they could operate stations which would
better serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity than
do current licensees. 0 '
Had the Commission in Hearst and Wabash actually followed the
principle it claimed to be applying-that an existing station with a good
operating record should be accorded a preference over a competing
applicant because past performance is the best indicator of future performance-the decisions would be sound. In fact, however, the majority applied the principle in such a way that the mere existence of the
6135 F.C.C. 677, 684 (1963).
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record, rather than a critical evaluation of its contents, was the determinative factor in the licensee's favor.
In 1965, the Commission issued a Policy Statement on Comparative
Broadcast Hearings,' in an effort to consolidate the many criteria previously considered by the Commission and to clarify the criteria and
their relative importance. Two basic objectives of the comparative
hearing were enumerated: the best practicable service to the public and
the maximum diffusion of control of the media of mass communications. Thus, the diversification criterion, hitherto regarded as one
factor among many, was given primary importance. The criteria which
related to the determination of the applicant who would provide the
best service were consolidated into three basic criteria-integration of
ownership and management, proposed programming, and past broadcast
record. Integration was transformed into an "umbrella" criterion encompassing the previously distinct factors of full-time participation by
the owners of the station in its operation, participation in local activities
by the owners, and past broadcast experience of the owners. In an
apparent effort to resolve the contradiction between the Commission's
efforts to diversify ownership and its according an advantage to initial
applicants with past broadcast records, the Commission stated that it
would not consider a past broadcast record that was "within the bounds
of average performance." Only records which demonstrated "unusual
attention to the public's needs and interests" would be granted a preference since average performance was to be expected of all licensees.
The Policy Statement, although breaking new ground, was deemed
to have relatively little impact in cases involving license renewals. The
Commission had noted in the Policy Statement itself that the Statement
was not applicable to the "somewhat different problems" involved in
hearings in which a renewal applicant was a party.6 Even the Commission's decision to apply the Policy Statement to the introduction of
evidence in renewal cases and to give all parties in such cases an
opportunity to present arguments as to the relative weight to be accorded
the various criteria " was not regarded as a portent of a major change
in renewal cases.
Then, in January 1969, a three-man majority 5 in WHDH held
that the Policy Statement was applicable to comparative hearings involving renewal applicants. The vehicle for the Commission's shift in
F.C.C2d 393 (1965).
Id. at 393 n.1.

621
63

Commissioner Hyde in his dissenting opinion observed that there was no rational
or legal basis for the Policy Statement's purported nonapplicability to comparative
hearings involving renewal applicants. Id. at 403.

104Seven (7) League Productions, Inc. (WIII), 1 F.C.C.2d 1597 (1965).

65 The majority was composed of Commissioners Bartley, Johnson, and Wadsworth, the latter generally categorized as a moderate or a conservative. The sole
dissenting member of the Commission was Robert E. Lee. Chairman Hyde abstained,
apparently because he was unable to decide the difficult case. 16 F.C.C.2d at 23.

Commissioner Cox did not participate and Commissioner H. Rex Lee was absent.
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policy was a case involving a challenge by three applicants against the
renewal applicant, WHDH, which sought a regular three-year renewal
at the end of a four-month initial grant which it had received because of
its efforts to subvert the Commission's procedures.0 6
Refusing to consider any non-comparative factors except WHDH's
failure to report a de facto change in control,6 7 the Commission granted
the competing applicants preferences on integration and diversification, 68
since WHDH is owned in common with two Boston radio stations and
a major Boston newspaper. With regard to proposed programming,
the majority found no substantial differences between the various proposals, but did accord the winner a slight demerit for its "insufficiently
supported local live programming proposal." 09 The Commission's decision on these criteria was certainly not startling or unpredictable. The
novelty of the decision lay in its application of the Policy Statement's
treatment of broadcast record to a renewal applicant. The majority
ruled that the Hearst-Wabash Valley doctrine was no longer applicable
and that a renewal applicant's past broadcast record would be considered only if it showed unusual attention to the public's needs. As
WHDH's record had been found by the hearing examiner to be favorable but not exceptional, the majority concluded that no consideration
could be given to it. Lacking a preference on any of the criteria,
WHDH was denied renewal and the license was awarded to one of the
challengers.
Thus the revolutionary aspect of the WHDH decision is that a
renewal applicant's past record will be disregarded if it is "within the
bounds of average performance." In such a case, he will be subject to
evaluation on the comparative hearing factors without any preference
over other parties due to his past record or present ownership of the
station in question.
Professor Jaffe 7 and many members of the communications bar,
however, believe that the interpretation of the Policy Statement in
WHDH reduces the major comparative criteria to integration of ownership and management, and diversification of the media of mass com06

The head of WHDH, Mr. Choate, had attempted to influence a member of the

Commission in the original licensing proceeding. WHDH, Inc., 33 F.C.C. 449 (1962).

07The major noncomparative issue with which Commissioner Bartley refused
to deal was whether Mr. Choate's ex parte contacts were to be treated as a factor in
the hearing even though he had died in 1963. 16 F.C.C2d at 7.
0sThe majority noted in reference to the diversification criterion that WHDH
had withheld broadcast of news to permit its sister newspaper to get a "scoop."
WHDH also refrained from broadcasting editorials to avoid the risk of expressing
views similar to those of its other media interests, thereby emphasizing the effect of
its control of several media in Boston. The Commission found that this was contrary
to its policy of encouraging licensees to editorialize. See Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
69 The winning challenger proposed to devote 36.3% of his broadcast time to local
live programming. The Commission found this to be so far in excess of that of any
network station that it required substantiating evidence which the challenger could
16 F.C.C2d at 16.
not supply.
7
oJaffe, supra note 51.
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munications. Admittedly, that element is emphasized throughout Commissioner Bartley's opinion for the three-man majority. But the Jaffe
interpretation places the cart before the horse.
The majority in WHDH never repudiated the basic assumption
underlying the Hearst-Wabash Valley principle: that a broadcaster's
past record is the best indication of his future performance. On the
contrary, Commissioner Bartley explicitly stated his agreement with that
assumption."' Where the majority parted company with Hearst,
Wabash Valley, and the hearing examiner's decision was on the weight
to be accorded an average record of performance.
Our basic disagreement with the examiner's conclusions
lies in the preferred status which he gave to WHDH "not
because it is an applicant for renewal but because it has an
operating record and its very existence as a functioning,
manned station to advance against its opponents, whose
promises, after all, are as yet just so much talk." . . .
[T]hat record is meaningful in the comparative
context only if it exceeds the bounds of average performance.
We believe that this approach is sound, for otherwise new
applicants competing with a renewal applicant would be placed
at a disadvantage if the renewal applicant entered the contest
with a built-in lead arising from the fact that it has a record as
an operating station. More importantly, the public interest is
better served when the foundations for determining the best
practicable service, as between a renewal and new applicant,
are more nearly equal at their outset."
The majority's reasoning is much more compelling than the hearing examiner's interpretation and application of the Hearst-Wabash
Valley principle. Since the ultimate objective of the comparative hearing is to determine which applicant can best serve the public interest
and since all applicants who are in the running can presumably provide
satisfactory service, a renewal applicant's record indicates he can better
serve the public interest only if it is substantially above the level of
performance which the Commission regards as satisfactory. Any challenger who is below this level will presumably be eliminated.
Furthermore, the reasoning of the majority comports with the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals's decisions dealing with
comparative hearings in which a renewal applicant was a party. In
both South FloridaTelevision Corp. v. FCC 7 and Community Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC 74 the court expressed a concern that a renewal
71

16 F.C.C2d at 9.

7216 F.C.C2d at 8-10.
73 349 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 987 (1966).
74 363 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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applicant not receive an advantage for having operated a station under
a four-month license. The court was not faced, however, with the
problem of considering whether according weight to a past broadcast
record was an unfair advantage, since the Commission had given little
value to the past broadcast record criterion under the circumstances.
But the Commission had given preferences to both renewal applicants
for broadcast experience, which was a separate criterion prior to the
Policy Statement. The majority in South Florida considered the
preference not unfair to the competing applicants although part of the
applicant's broadcast experience considered was his four months of
operation under the short-term license. Judge Wright in dissent condemned the advantage accorded renewal applicants, citing Hearst and
Wabash Valley, and termed such special treatment of renewal applicants
a clear violation of the Communications Act.75 In a virtually identical
case a year later, a unanimous court, including Judge Wright, again
affirmed the Commission's choice of the renewal applicant but on much
different grounds.7" It reasoned that the preference for broadcast experience could be justified because the renewal applicant had suffered
through a decade-long initial licensing proceeding which had been
aborted by the actions of its competitors and not by its own wrongdoing.
The court thus concluded that the Commission's sense of fairness might
reasonably give recognition to the renewal applicant's long battle for the
original license and the hardship of undergoing the comparative hearing
to which competing applicants were virtually invited because the initial
licensing proceeding had ended in an award by default.77 This reasoning was completely inapplicable in the WHDH case since there the
party most responsible for the frustration of the original licensing hearings was WHDH itself. What was applicable in WHDH was the basic
75

The effect of the Commission's ruling here, and its prior rulings [citing
Wabash Valley and Hearst] giving a preferential position to license holders,
is in derogation of the congressional command and apparently is responsible
for the private sales of television stations in urban areas running into millions
of dollars.

349 F2d at 973.
miUsing somewhat cryptic language, the court apparently recognized that the
Commission had given the renewal applicant in South Florida an unfair preference
because it was a renewal applicant:
[In South Florida] it seems clear that the Commission counted, in the
licensee's broadcast experience, the experience representing the operation of
the station under the license for which a renewal was sought. In its opinion
the Commission, in addressing itself to the category of broadcast experience,
described the two principal owners and operators of the licensee as having
"an impressive background of broadcast experience, also encompassing
operation of a television station in the Miami area." This last could only
have referred to the operation under the four-months license. In its brief,
appellant in South Florida pointed this out, and argued that the Commission
had acted unfairly in taking it into consideration. Thus it is that some
ambiguity attaches to the court's statement in South Florida that in none of
the categories other than broadcast performance was the licensee "given an
unfair advantage by virtue of being a license renewal applicant."

363 F2d at 721, n.6.
77 363 F2d at 721-22.
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principle expressed in the opinions of all the judges in the two casesthat the renewal applicant cannot be accorded an unfair advantage
because of the mere fact of his prior operation of the station.
Unlike the court of appeals cases, in WHDH the question was
presented how this principle should be applied where there was a
broadcast record. WHDH had a record made under a temporary
authorization that could not be dismissed, as could its four-month
license term, on the grounds that its operation under the inevitable
threat of challenge was not indicative of its future performance."
WHDH is thus a reasonable attempt by the Commission to make use
of the evidentiary value of a broadcast record while avoiding giving a
renewal applicant an automatic preference merely because he is the
present licensee.
B. The Propriety of Evaluating a Broadcast Record
The majority's approach to the issue of past broadcast record requires the Commission to evaluate that record, at least to determine
whether it falls in the category of average. Professor Jaffe notes not only
that such an evaluation is difficult but also that it raises the fundamental
question of the propriety of any official rating of performance.79 But
since the past record is the best available indicator of future performance,
the difficulty of rating the record should not be taken as a reason for
refusing to consider it at all. Nonetheless, this difficulty does mean that
the Commission ought to limit itself to establishing general standards
with respect to those aspects of past performance that will be accorded
predominant weight in future decisions. The standards must be general
since they must be applicable to all cases and must avoid limiting the
options available to the licensee in his efforts to provide the best service
to his community. They should not accord appreciable weight to minor
gradations in performance which reflect mere variations in judgment.
78sFour-month initial licenses have been granted by the Commission when it
considered that the conduct of some or all of the parties to the licensing proceedings
frustrated the purpose of the proceedings. The short-term grant is viewed by the
licensee and potential applicants as an invitation by the Commission to competing
applicants to challenge the licensee upon the expiration of the initial license. See
WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C.2d 29, 233 (1969) (initial decision of Hearing Examiner
Herbert Sharfman). Consequently, licensees under a short-term initial license have a
great incentive to build up an impressive broadcast record. For that very reason, the
Commission has generally accorded little weight to broadcast records made under
short-term grants.
However, a temporary authorization to provide broadcast service to a community
pending the outcome of a comparative hearing provides considerably less incentive.
The broadcast record compiled under the temporary authorization will not be considered in the selection of the licensee in the absence of gross misconduct. Therefore, in a
subsequent renewal hearing, a broadcast record made under a temporary authorization
should have an evidentiary value comparable to a record made under a regular license.
Since WHDH had broadcast for five years under a temporary authorization, the
hearing examiner attached considerable weight to WHDH's broadcast record. Thus,
the Commission was compelled to face the issue it had avoided in South Florida and
Community.
79 Jaffe, supra note 51, at 1697-98.
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The formula promulgated in the Policy Statement and applied in
WHDH-"unusual attention to the public's needs and interests, such as
special sensitivity to an area's changing needs through flexibility of
local programs designed to meet those needs" 8°-complies with these
minimum requirements. But it leaves a major problem unresolved.
The broadcasting industry was stung by the WHDH decision, not just
because of a temperamental hostility to competition, but because of the
real and urgent threat such competition presents to the industry's
economic security in the context of a regulatory process which has
notoriously failed to establish clear standards on which reliance proportional to the size of the investment could be placed. Before WHDH
the problem did not exist. Investment was protected because there was
no real competition at renewal time. WHDH has created a pressing
need for clarity, consistency, and predictability in the Commission's
standards. One way to achieve this is for the Commission to elaborate
such improved standards on a case-by-case basis. The alternative is to
attack the problem on a broader front either by Commission rulemaking or congressional legislation.
Official rating of performance presents two problems. The first
is constitutional, but is the less serious of the two in light of the Supreme
Court's unanimous decision in Red Lion v. FCC."' In perhaps the most
important decision ever handed down in the field of communications,
Justice White held:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents
the Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or
fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices
which are representative of his community and which would
otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airvaves.8 2

The language of the opinion reaches far beyond the limited scope of
the "fairness doctrine" then under consideration, for the Court asserted
that the public has a right of access to social, political, moral, esthetic,
and other ideas." That right could be enforced by conditioning the
renewal of licenses on a willingness to present views of representatives
of the community, and on fulfilling an affirmative obligation to deal
with the problems that affect the people in the licensee's community., 4
In the view of the FCC's general counsel, there is now no doubt that the
Commission can require a broadcaster to devote a certain amount of
his programming to news, public affairs, and non-entertainment
programming.8
80 1 F.C.C.2d 393, 398 (1965).

81395 U.S. 367 (1969).
82
d. at 389.
83
1d. at 390.
841d. at 394.
85 See BROADCASTING, Sept. 15, 1969 at 34-35.
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Although an evaluation of past performance must obviously deal
with the broadcaster's product-his programming-it need not judge
the quality of program content, except in the case of gross deficiencies.
The primary factor to be considered in evaluating a broadcaster's record
is the amount and breakdown of the time allocated to the presentation
of programs dealing with matters of concern to his audience. The
present classification of program types provides the foundation for such
an evaluation. 6 The subject matter of individual programs may be
considered to determine whether the licensee is actually presenting
programming for all major elements of his viewing audience, or
whether one or a few elements are catered to at the expense of the
others. Gross quality deficiencies in program production should be considered in this evaluation since very low quality may 87negative what
would otherwise be a preference for program allocation.
The other problem is that any process of evaluation by a regulatory
body, especially the FCC, may induce stifling uniformity."' Evidence
of this danger is found in the proposals of applicants for an initial
license and to a lesser extent in the programming proposals of renewal
applicants.8 9 However, since many licensees devote very little time to
non-entertainment programming,' uniformity, insofar as it would increase the amount of such time, would be an improvement." Furthermore, a measure of uniformity is the inevitable price of securing that
predictability in the comparative hearing process the present absence
of which is a major reason for the industry's objections to WHDH.9
86

See note 31 supra.

87 See Irion, FCC Criteria for Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MrxN.
REv. 479, 493 (1959).

L.

88

See Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C2d 393,
400 (1965) (dissenting statement of Commissioner Hyde).
89

See text accompanying notes 37-40 supra.

90 A 1967 study showed that of the 5,643 licensees which responded to the questionnaire, 513 had no news or public service programming (497 others failed to
answer the question) ; 1,338 had 10 hours or less a week; 1,883 had 10 to 21 hours
a week. Over 900 devoted less than an hour a week to locally originated news and
STAFF OF
public affairs programs (again 497 failed to answer the question).
SUBCOIMM. ON COMfMUNICATIONS OF THE SENATE CoMMq. ON COMMERCE, 90TH CONG.,
2D SESs., REPORT ON THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 98-99 (Comm. Print 1968).

91 Definite standards as to the amount of commercialization and non-entertainment
programming may also protect the broadcasters from themselves. Examiner Donahue
in KHJ-TV concluded that General Tire would never operate a good public interest
station without rules establishing standards of air-time utilization because of General
Tire's obligations to its shareholders. RKO General, Inc. (KHJ-TV), 16 P & F
RADIO REG. 2d 1181, 1271 (1969), (initial decision of Hearing Examiner Thomas H.
Donahue).
92 The comparative hearing process is inherently difficult to administer because
of the number of criteria which must be considered, the absence of a burden of proof
on the ultimate issue, and the difficulty of balancing slight preferences and demerits
of the several parties on different criteria. In addition most of the parties are usually
well-qualified and the Commission often shifts its emphasis on the various policy
objectives. The result is that the process frequently seems more chaotic than rational.
See JONES at A112.
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C. The Policy Statement in Comparative Hearings Involving
Renewal Applicants
A major problem concerning the application of the Policy Statement to renewal applicants remains to be considered. The fact must be
recognized that there are important differences between a comparative
hearing to which a renewal applicant is a party and a regular initial
licensing proceeding. The differences, however, are not so great that
the policy of WHDH must be restricted to the facts of that unique
case. Rather, with modifications which take into account the differences in the evidence presented in a renewal case and the impact of the
use of competing applications on the broadcasting industry, the Policy
Statement as interpreted in WHDH can provide the basis for the
rational development of a policy for handling comparative hearings involving renewal applicants.
The two principal policy objectives of the comparative hearing
process according to the Policy Statement are "the best practicable
service to the public" and "a maximum diffusion of control of the media
of mass communications." ' All but one of the comparative factors
enumerated in the Policy Statement-integration of ownership and
management, proposed program service, past broadcast record, efficient
use of the frequency, character-are directed toward determining the
applicant most likely to provide the best service to the public. The
other comparative factor-diversification of control-is directed toward
diffusing control of mass communications media.
In determining which applicant will provide the best public service,
the most reliable indicator is the renewal applicant's record of performance. That record demonstrates how well the renewal applicant has,
and therefore presumably will, serve the public whereas the other
criteria establish less solid inferences that an applicant will render a
certain level of public service. Even for this purpose the usefulness of
the criteria is questionable in view of the absence of any empirical evidence to support several of the inferences derived from them.04 Therefore, especially since the outcome of the comparative hearing depends to
a considerable degree on the credibility of the parties' proposals, the
past broadcast record of a renewal applicant will tend to be the most
important criterion in the comparative hearing.
To a significant degree, the renewal applicant's past record will
also be relevant to the decisions on the other criteria. Certainly, an
exceptional broadcast record would be determinative on the criterion of
proposed programming since the Commission can legitimately infer that
the renewal applicant's proposed programming will not differ significantly from his past programming. With regard to the integration
criterion, for which the Commission considers the involvement of the
owner of the station in the day-to-day management, the record tends
F.C.C2d 393, 394 (1965).
See Jaffe, supra note 51, at 1696-97.
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to demonstrate the licensee's sensitivity to the needs of his communityone of the objectives of the integration criterion. With regard to the
second objective of the integration criterion, that legal responsibility
reside in the persons who actually operate the station, the Commission
should examine the renewal applicant's past operation to determine if
the lack of integration has impeded compliance with FCC rules or the
effective operation of the station. Even the criterion of character will
be judged to some extent on the licensee's past relations with the Commission and its conformity with FCC rules. Thus, assuming that the
renewal applicant with an outstanding broadcast record has not been
derelict in meeting its legal responsibility to the Commission, it should
have a preference on the proposed programming criterion, and the
integration criterion should receive only minimal consideration.
The one criterion on which a renewal applicant with an outstanding
record is likely to have the greatest disadvantage, diversification, involves issues of widespread significance. 5 The fact is that, with the
approval of the FCC, control of communications media in the major
markets has become concentrated in the hands of a relatively few
persons and corporations.98 Were the Commission to hold that even
a licensee with an outstanding broadcast record could be ousted for
less than a monopolistic concentration of control, the effect would be
to compel divestiture of a multitude of valuable broadcast and newspaper properties throughout the nation. The adoption of a policy with
such a widespread impact and possibly unforeseen consequences should
be left to the Commission's rule-making power. A rule such as that
proposed by the Justice Department, which would compel licensees with
other broadcast and newspaper interests in a market to divest themselves of all but one of their properties, would allow all multimedia
owners to minimize their losses and not just those who sold before they
were challenged by a competing applicantY Furthermore, a rulemaking would eliminate the uncertainty of case-by-case determination
of the degree of concentration that would override favorable decisions
on the other criteria.9" At least in situations where the renewal applicant has demonstrated a record of outstanding service to the com95 Of the over 150 VHF stations in the 50 largest markets, less than 10% are
owned by entities that do not own other media interests. Johnson, The Media Barons
and the Public Interest: An FCC Commissioner's Warning, ATLANTIC MONTHLY June

1968, at 43, 48.
96
Twenty group owners, many of which also own newspaper chains, own almost
half of the television stations in the top 50 markets. Trask, The Palace of Humbug-

A Study of FCC Policies Relating to Group Ownership of Television Stations, 22
FED.

Comm. B.J. 185, 199 (1968).
97 Comments of the United States Department of Justice (brief submitted in

rulemaking), It re Amendment of §§ 73.35, 73240, and 73.636 of the Commission's
rules relating to multiple ownership of standard, FM, and television broadcast stations,
No. 18110 (F.C.C., proposed March 28, 1968).
98
See Comment, The Federal Communications Commission and Comparative
Broadcast Hearings: WHDH as a Case Study in Changing Standards, 10 B.C. IND.

& Comm. L. REv. 943, 968 (1969).
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munity, it seems only fair to permit the licensee to sell the station since
the reason for his loss of license is not his own failure but that of the
Commission in granting the license in the first place.
The renewal applicant who brings a worse-than-average record
to a comparative hearing, on the other hand, should be at a severe disadvantage even if he is the manager of the station, proposes spectacular
programming, and owns no interest in any other media. Any other
applicant who can persuade the Commission that he will satisfactorily
perform should have a preference.
The most difficult case involves the licensee whose broadcast
record is only average. In such a situation, the licensee's past broadcast record is not determinative. The Commission is therefore limited
to a comparison of the applicants on the standard comparative criteria.
Admittedly, comparing renewal applicants and challengers is something
like comparing apples and oranges. The credibility of the renewal applicant's proposals is limited by his past performance. He must stand
or fall on his record made in the rough and tumble of the competitive
business world. That record will be marred by real inadequacies,
errors in judgment, and complaints from listeners lie was not able to
satisfy. Deficiencies can be found in the record of even an outstanding
broadcaster. On the other hand, a challenger can make his proposals
secure in the knowledge that there is no record to impeach his
credibility.
The Commission is aware of this difficulty. The challenger's programming proposals presumably will be scrutinized to determine their
practicality, the probability of implementation, and their relationship
with the needs of the community.99 Such proposals may not, under the
Policy Statement, be accorded a preference unless they show "a superior
devotion to public service," such as unusual attention to community
affairs. 00
It seems probable that in many cases the only major difference
between the parties will involve diversification. As noted above, the
problem of concentration of control of the media is better handled by
rulemaking than case-by-case adjudication. In the absence of a rule,
it is likely that the Commission would follow the approach used in
WHDH: analysis of the degree of concentration in a market and its
effect on the station's past operation. 10' Certainly, where there is evidence that common ownership of different media adversely affected the
licensee's service to the public, as the Commission found in WHDH,
there is sufficient reason to accord the diversification factor considerable
weight. 02 Here again, making diversification the determining factor in
99
The Commission, in fact, did this in WHDH and gave one of the challengers
a demerit for its failure to provide evidence establishing the plausibility of its proposed
high percentage of local live programming. WHDH, Inc., 16 F.C.C2d 7, 16 (1969).
100 1 F.C.C2d 393, 397 (1965).
101 16 F.C.C2d at 12-13.
02
3 See note 68 supra.
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cases where no such evidence is presented is tantamount to penalizing
the licensee for the mistake of the Commission. Thus, in the absence
of a rule, diversification should not be considered an important
criterion. This is especially so where the degree of concentration is
relatively small, for instance, where a television and a radio station in
the same market are owned in common.
In conclusion, renewal applicants in comparative hearings who
demonstrate broadcast records sufficiently above average to be considered should have an insurmountable advantage. However, those
with records substantially below average should be vulnerable to attack
by any satisfactory challenger. The scope of the comparative hearing
in both instances should thus be reduced to the single issue of the
caliber of the licensee's past performance.
Only where the renewal applicant's record is merely average and
therefore not to be taken as determinative, should he be exposed to the
other comparative criteria as was WHDH. The Commission should be
somewhat skeptical of "paper" programming proposals of challengers,
as it was in WHDH; in evaluating renewal applicants, it should look
behind the integration criterion as it failed to do in WHDH. Even in
a close case, small differences in diversification, not involving substantial control of the community media by any party, should not be determinative, unless a policy change is announced in a rulemaking
proceeding.
The future course of FCC decisions may not conform to this pattern. But, however WHDH is interpreted, many applications have
been and will be "filed on top" of renewal applications on the basis of
the policy enunciated by Commissioner Bartley. In view of the low
level of meaningful programming today, the policy of WHDH has
revolutionary potential.
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE: THE PASTORE BILL
A. The Development of the Conflict
The irony of the decision in VHDH is that the Commission's
"desperate and spasmodic lurch to 'the left' "103 may ultimately result
in an irremediable congressional turn to the right. Even before the
Commission had acted on the parties' motions for reconsideration in
WHDH, the broadcasters' lobby had garnered considerable support
for a major amendment of the Communications Act to make licensees
virtually unassailable by competing applicants. By the first week in
August, Senator Pastore's subcommittee on communications was already conducting hearings on his own version of what the industry
termed the "anti-strike" 104 bill.
lo3 Jaffe, WHDH: The FCC and Broadcasting License Renewals, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1693, 1700 (1969).
104 "Anti-strike" is a complete misnomer. It refers to "strike applications," those
filed without any intention of operating a station, but solely to prevent another applicant from getting a license without a hearing. See notes 123 & 124 infra & accompanying text.
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However, a combination of circumstances and events may have
eroded the momentum of the broadcasters' campaign and raised doubts
among many congressmen about the wisdom of the proposed amendment. The August hearings before the Senate subcommittee were
shortened because of the ABM debate and the Senate's August recess.
Other pressing business forced postponement of the hearings which had
been tentatively scheduled to reconvene in the middle of September.
Meanwhile, opponents of the bill have revealed serious deficiencies in
the industry's programming and demonstrated its frequent unresponsiveness to the needs of important and sizable segments of its audience.
That RKO General could operate, with the FCC's apparent blessing, a
VHF channel in the second most lucrative market in the country, which
devoted nearly ninety percent of its time to entertainment (primarily
old movies), °5 shocked even persons close to the industry. A recent
study evaluating the programming of thirty-two television stations in
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia
demonstrated that some of the stations in major markets were deficient
by any standard. 0
The most blatant example is WMAL-TV in
Washington, owned by the Evening Star Newspaper Company; it
ranked 25th out of 32 in the study, whereas its three VHF competitors
led all other stations in the region. 17
During this period Negro organizations and leaders throughout
the country joined in a movement to improve programming. In
Texarkana, Texas, several Negro groups together with the city's
Chamber of Commerce filed a petition to deny the license of KTAL-TV,
contending among other things that the station was not responsive to
the needs of the black community. Fearing a long hearing on the
petition, the station made an agreement with the protesting groups to
reform its programming and meet regularly with representatives of
community organizations.'
WMAL-TV in Washington is also the
object of a petition to deny by a group of black residents, and an
organization named BEST (Black Efforts for Soul in Television) has
recently been created to obtain programming more meaningful to Negro
and other minority groups. 0 9 Such activity by minority groups lends
support to the opponents of the Pastore bill who claim that it will
prevent any change in current programming, especially on television,
105 RKO General, Inc. (KHJ-TV), 16 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1181, 1194 (1969)
(initial decision of Hearing Examiner Thomas H. Donahue).
1'0 6 INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, TELEviSION TODAY: THE END OF ComMUNICATION AND THE DEATH OF COMMUNITY 119-20 (1969).

107Id. 111-13, 125-26.
108 KCMC, Inc. (KTAL-TV), 16 P & F RADIO

REG.

2d 1067 (1969).

The

Commission unanimously supported the renewal grant, despite the fact that it felt
serious issues had been raised by the petition, because it sought to encourage licensees
to settle complaints of local broadcast service with community groups.
109 BROADCASTING, Sept. 8, 1969, at 25.
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which caters almost exclusively to the white, middle-class, segment
of the audience."'
It is ironic that Vice President Agnew, proclaiming himself the
spokesman of the middle class, may have also caused conservative supporters of the bill to have second thoughts. In a nationally televised
speech, the Vice President denounced the "biased" reporting of the networks.'" Although the speech was precipitated by the critical remarks
of network commentators after President Nixon's address on the
Vietnam War, the Vice President expressed concern about the unchecked power of the three networks to influence the American people.
Surprisingly, he used much of the rhetoric generally associated with
Commissioner Johnson, whom the broadcasters view as the ultra-liberal
of the FCC.
The implications of Mr. Agnew's speech for the Pastore bill are
manifold. Those who support Mr. Agnew's views should recognize
that the networks own only fifteen of the hundreds of stations on which
the networks' news and views are aired. Relatively few of these nonnetwork stations devote any significant amount of time to news analysis
(as distinguished from news reporting), controversial discussion, or
editorials." 2 Yet, the political and social views of many of the owners
and managers of the network affiliates are different from those of the
network news commentators. Thus, much of the power of persuasion
that the Vice President attributed to the networks is due to the failure
of affiliated stations to meet their obligation as licensees: to present
differing points of view on important issues. Consequently, the Pastore
bill would not only protect the networks, who are regulated only through
their owned-and-operated stations, but would also eliminate any incentive for affiliated stations to present points of view different from
those of the networks.
Those who feel that the Vice President's remarks point out a
threat to freedom of thought and expression, and therefore support the
Pastore bill on the ground that it protects that freedom," 3 should
recognize that passage of the bill will mean that neither the public nor
the FCC will ever be able to induce broadcasters to present programs
dealing with thought-provoking issues. Freedom of thought and ex110 Stavins, Public Interest: Old and New, in TELEvis Io TODAY, supra note 106,
at 70, 87.
"' N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1969, at 1, col. 2. For the text of the speech see id. 24.
112A Congressional report found that almost half of the commercial television
stations responding to its questionnaire had never carried editorials even though the
Commission has for two decades encouraged editorializing.

See Editorializing by

Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). Only about a quarter of the stations
responding carried editorials on a regular basis.
Public access to the airwaves was apparently more restricted. Less than 10%
of the stations had an "open mike" program which is the easiest and most popular
method of presenting different points of view on important issues. STAFF OF SuBcoMM.
ON COMMUNICATIONS OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 90TH CONG. 2D SESs.. FAIRNESS DOCTRINE 141-360 (Comm. Print 1968).

11 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1969, at 26, col. 5 (remarks of Senator Pastore).
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pression means little in broadcasting if broadcast time is devoted almost
exclusively to movies, situation comedies, detective stories, and games.
B. The PastoreBill and Its Rationale
The Pastore bill which is creating so much controversy provides:
That section 309 (a) [of the Communications Act of 1934]
shall be amended by adding the following after the final sentence thereof: "Notwithstanding any other provision of the
Act, the Commission, in acting upon any application for renewal of a broadcast license filed under section 308, may not
consider the application of any other person for the facilities
for which renewal is sought. If the Commission finds upon
the record and representations of the licensee that the public
interest, convenience, and necessity has been and would be
served thereby, it shall grant the renewal application. If the
Commission determines after a hearing that a grant of the
application of a renewal applicant would not be in the public
interest, convenience, and necessity, it shall deny such application, and applications for construction permits by other parties
may then be accepted, pursuant to section 308, for the broadcast service previously licensed to the renewal applicant whose
renewal was denied." 14
The bill is premised on the assumption that security of investment
among the broadcasting industry will ultimately benefit the public." 5
Considering the immense investment by licensees in equipment, facilities,
programming, and personnel, this undoubtedly is an important aspect
of the renewal challenge issue. The facts demonstrate that a large
initial investment is necessary to enter the television broadcasting field.
Whether the licensee receives the initial license for the station or purchases it, he may not recover his investment for many years, depending
on the type of broadcast facility he operates and the market in which it
is located. Furthermore, merely maintaining a competitive station requires that he invest in modem equipment and improve his facilities.
Three years is frequently not enough to carry out major expansion or
technological improvements. Long-term contracts are necessary to
attract and keep experienced, talented personnel. Programming must
be planned and purchased years in advance. The possibility of losing
a license every three years would have a drastic impact on the ability of
broadcasters to obtain capital and credit. It would probably induce
many licensees to diversify for their own security. At the same time,
114 S2004, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
115 Cf. Transcript of Proceedings, vol. 1, at 22-30, Hearings on S.2004 Before the
Subconin. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st

Sess. (1969)

S2004].

(testimony of Frank P. Fogarty) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
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the insecurity would inhibit experimentation and nonprofitable programming.""
These factual generalizations, however, present only one side of
the picture. Broadcasting also yields a high return on investment.
The average VHF station recovered over 64% of its depreciated cost
in 1967 alone,' 17 one of television's least profitable years."' Recovery
of investment can be much more rapid. For example, WCBS-TV in
New York recovered 2,290 per cent of its total investment in tangible
broadcast property in 1955 alone." 9 The average VHF station recovers
its investment in a license period and makes a handsome profit besides. 2 '
Many stations, notably network affiliates in top markets, earn even
more. Thus, security of investment is somewhat less important than
it appears at first glance, especially in the more attractive and lucrative
markets, where challenges are most likely.' 2
Furthermore, there are ways of minimizing the losses of the displaced licensee. The FCC could require victorious applicants to pay a
reasonable price for the station's facilities 12 and assume some, if not
all, of its long-term obligations.
Another possible financial burden which the WfHDH policy presents is the "strike application." "Strike application" is industry jargon
for an application filed with no intent to operate the station but for the
sole purpose of forcing the licensee to "buy off" the strike applicant to
16 Id. 25-30.
117 Computed from FCC Statistics. 34 FCC ANN. REP. 122,
118 According to FCC statistics the VHF stations recovered

126 (1968).
approximately 84%

of their depreciated investment in tangible broadcast properties in 1966 and 94%
in 1965. 33 FCC ANN. REP. 173, 176 (1967) ; 32 FCC ANN. REP. 125, 126 (1966).
119 Hearings on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries Before the Antitrust Subcomin. (Subcomin. No. 5) of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., 3352 (1957).
120 Earl K. Moore representing the National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting
testified that the average television station recovers its depreciated investment twice
over with a reasonable return besides in a license term. Transcript of Proceedings,
vol. 3, at 255, Hearings on S.2004.
121 The only broadcasters who might suffer any great loss from the adoption of
the WHDH policy are those who purchased stations within a few years prior to the
WHDH decision. Undoubtedly the bulk of the purchase price was for expected profits
over the next few years in anticipation of the continuance of the Commission's automatic renewal policy. See note 56 supra. If a substantial number of broadcasters in
the major markets were in this situation, there might be a good reason to find a way
to minimize their losses in the event that they were ousted by a challenger. The
statistics show, however, that the chances of a challenge to a station which has not
been able to recover its full purchase price are small. Forty-three VHF stations, out of
157 in the 50 largest markets, have been purchased by the present owner since the
beginning of 1957. Of these only 8 will have had less than 6 years to recover the
purchase price when they are next vulnerable to challenge. Two of the 8 stations will
have had 4 years, and the other 6 will have had 5 years. This does not include the
period of operation during the comparative hearings and the court appeals, which
together will probably run 3 to 5 years and possibly more. Statistics compiled from
TL.rEvisioN FAcTBooK (STATIONS VOLUME) (1968-69).
122 Determining the reasonable or market value of broadcast facilities should not
be difficult in view of fact that the industry currently has a market through so-called
"station dealers." Victorious applicants should only be required to pay for tangible
property and not for the value of the license, which is often the major portion of
the sale price of a station. See note 56 supra.
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avoid a hearing. Under current FCC rules and procedures "strike applications" are extremely unlikely. The Commission has established
exacting standards with which all initial applicants must comply before
they are considered for a comparative hearing.'3 Furthermore, the
FCC's regulations require complete disclosure of any compensation paid
or promised for the withdrawal of an application,'2 and impose penalties
for violation of such regulations. These prophylactic measures still do
not prevent the filing of a legitimate competing application against a
licensee with an exceptional record, and forcing him through a long and
expensive comparative hearing in which the challenger has little chance
of victory. But the enormous expense of preparing an application, making the required surveys, and contesting a case, 25 is likely to deter aplications against licensees who have excellent records. Competing
applications are much more likely to be filed against licensees with
records that will be disregarded in the comparative hearing under the
WHDH policy.
A second major reason for the Pastore bill is a lack of confidence
in the comparative hearing process. Both the Commission and the
process have been severely criticized by experts on administrative law
for years.'2 6 Despite a multitude of precedents and the guidelines set
forth in the Commission's policy statements, a party to a comparative
hearing can never safely predict how much weight will be accorded to
particular evidence or criteria. Professor Jones concluded his analysis
of the comparative hearing by observing that there is "a degree of uncertainty and unpredictability that is probably unsurpassed in any other
decisional context." 127 It is easy to understand the fears of those
1= Applicants for construction permits must give evidence of:

(1) financial ability;

(2) serious intent;
(3) community involvement.
The FCC also requires submission of complete engineering, programming, staffing
and budgeting plans. FCC Form 301.

12447 C.F.R. § 1.525(c) (1) (1969). If consideration was paid or promised, the
parties involved must file affidavits disclosing:
a) the exact nature of any compensation paid or promised;
b) which party initiated negotiations;
c) a summary of the history of the negotiations;
d) why the arrangement is in public interest;
e) a justification of the consideration paid or promised.
47 C.F.R. § 1.525(a) (1969).
125 The New York Times estimated that the cost of challenging a licensee by a
competitive application was at least $250,000. N.Y. Times, April 27, 1969, § 1. at 72,
col. 5.

126 See, e.g., JONES, LICENSING OF MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY THE FEDERAL
Co muNIcAT oS CommissIoN, (1962), reprinted in Hearings on the Federal Communications Commission, Before Subcommn. No. 6 of House Select Comm. on Small
Business, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., A87, A105-12, A165, (1966) [hereinafter cited as
JoNEs]; LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGEXcIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT, 53-54
(1960); Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need for Better
Definition of Standards,75 HARv. L. REv. 1055 (1962) ; Levin, Regulatory Efficiency,

Reform and the FCC, 50 GEo.L.J. 1 (1961).
127 JONES,

at A112.
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skeptical of the Commission's ability to balance the "paper" proposals
of a challenger against the performance of an operating broadcaster. 8
This does not mean, however, that the comparative hearing process
should be eliminated. Many of the faults of the comparative hearing
might be eliminated by the promulgation of more definite standards.
C. 4 Critique of the Pastore Bill
Even if the policy set forth in WHDH has certain undesirable
aspects, eliminating that policy would not necessarily improve the broadcasting regulation system or the quality of programming. Several considerations support the conclusion that enactment of the Pastore bill
would diminish the likelihood of the development of effective regulation,
and virtually eliminate the strongest potential incentive for licensees to
improve programming.
The present renewal process is one of the most ineffective regulatory devices imaginable. This is principally due to three factors: the
FCC's small staff, the inability of representatives of the listening public
adequately to present their grievances to the Commission, and the reluctance of the Commission to set and enforce minimal standards.
WHDH's policy of encouraging renewal applications would help to
remedy all of these problems. Heavy commitments of funds and personnel are required to monitor stations,1 2

9

to survey the needs and

problems of the community, to develop imaginative programming to
meet the needs of the viewing audience, and to ascertain what programming is practical on a certain station in a particular market. The value
of broadcast licenses, especially in the more lucrative markets, would
make expenditures of this type by competing applicants worthwhile.
Furthermore, potential competing applicants would be induced to seek
out representatives of groups which feel that a local station or stations
are not adequately meeting their needs, thereby giving representatives
of the public a voice before the Commission that they have previously
been frequently denied. 30° Finally, the very fact that the Commission is
obliged under present law to hold a hearing and render a decision when
a competing application is filed would force it into a more active role in
the renewal process and would put added pressure on it to establish
more definite standards for programming and station operation.
Encouraging competing applications could also provide a stimulus
for licensees to improve service to local communities, consult with local
28
See Transcript of Proceedings, vol. 1, at 61-62, Hearings on S.2004 (Testimony
of Morton H. Wilner, President, Federal Communications Bar Ass'n).
129 In the case against WLBT, the protesters hired a team of 17 persons to
monitor the station's programming and public service announcements. Considerable
time was also spent determining the racial composition of the groups mentioned in
the public service announcements to determine if the station discriminated against
nonwhite groups. Transcript of Proceedings, vol. 3, at 314, Hearings on S.2004
of Earl K. Moore).
(testimony
13 0 See notes 46-47 supra & accompanying text.
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groups and local leaders, and adopt better programming. 31 The threat
of competition might even induce profit-motivated broadcasters to 3 con2
sider the "public interest" ahead of the desires of their advertisers.
Admittedly, the Pastore bill would not completely immunize the
licensee from challenge at renewal time. But the only procedure available to a group which desires to replace the licensee would be so long,
complicated, and expensive that the economic incentive which lies at the
heart of "regulation by competing application" would be greatly
diminished. Instead of proceeding through one hearing before the
Commission and a possible court appeal, the challenger under the Pastore
proposal would have to go through a hearing and probable court appeal
on his petition to deny. If he were able to demonstrate that renewal was
not in the public interest, the challenger could apply for a construction
permit, proceed through a probable comparative hearing and a second
court appeal, and then possibly obtain the license. As if this more complicated procedure were not sufficient to deter most competing applicants,
the Pastore bill places certain additional obstacles in the challenger's

path.
131 Perhaps the greatest benefit to be derived from the WHDH policy is not that
some existing broadcasters will be replaced but rather that all broadcasters will be
induced to remedy deficiencies that local community groups find in their operation
and programming before the groups go to the Commission or a competing application
is filed based on the groups' complaints. By this means much can be accomplished
without the trouble of seeking the Commission's aid. See KCMC, Inc. (KTAL-TV),
16 P & F RADIo REG. 2d 1067 (1969).
132 In addition, the WHDH policy would tend to lessen the present competitive
business disadvantage of licensees who are fulfilling their obligations to their communities, usually at a sacrifice of potential profits and ratings, while their competitors ignore their responsibilities. The inequities of the present situation in the
broadcasting industry can perhaps be best illustrated by reference to the record of a
daytime-only station which was recently discussed in Terre Haute Broadcasting Corp.,
16 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 757 (1969) (initial decision of Hearing Examiner David I.
Kraushaar). The station was acquired by a husband and wife only six years ago.
As the sole daytime-only station in the market, it was probably at a competitive disadvantage from the outset. The licensee, finding that local news was not being adequately developed by the primary news media in the area (a television station and newspaper owned in common) increased its reporting staff and commenced a news format
including in-depth analysis of local events and problems. Within a few years, the licensee
was able to devote 1/3 of his programming to news, to inaugurate daily "open mike"
and interview programs and sponsor guest editorials. When the city was without any
local newspaper due to a strike, the licensee altered its programming to become a
virtual "newspaper of the air" with additional news programs, classified ads, stock
market reports, theater schedules, and obituaries.
One wonders how many other broadcasters respond to the needs of the community,
risking substantial investments and loss of advertising revenue, to receive only an
expedited license renewal every three years and a preference if they are ever involved in a comparative hearing for another license.
The history of the Pacifica stations' bouts with the FCC, however, demonstrates
that the presentation of controversial views on local and national issues may jeopardize
even these small rewards. Pacifica's orientation toward the presentation of controversy has thus far resulted in a lengthy deferral, Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C.
147 (1964), a petition to revoke its licensee, United Federation of Teachers, 17
F.C.C2d 204 (1969), and extensive opposition to its application for a license in Washington, D.C. In these cases, Pacifica, which is mainly supported by its listeners, has
stood alone without any aid from the broadcasting industry at the same time that the
industry was spending huge sums of money fighting the FCC's attempt to regulate
commercials and its personal attack rule as abridgements of first amendment rights.
United Federation of Teachers, 17 F.C.C.2d 204, 210 (1969) (separate statement of
Commissioner Johnson).
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The amendment appears to effect a shift in both the standard and
the burden of proof which the Commission must follow. The present
statutory language makes an affirmative determination that renewal
would be in the public interest a prerequisite to the granting of the application,'3 3 thereby implying that if the Commission is unable to make
that affirmative finding it should deny renewal. The amendment first
directs the Commission to examine the licensee's record and representations. At this point it can only grant renewal if it is able to make
a finding that renewal would be in the public interest. If it cannot make
such a finding, or if there is a substantial and material question of fact,

the amendment, read in conjunction with the present statute,' 34 directs
the Commission to hold a hearing. The language of the amendment
with regard to the hearing is limited to telling the Commission what it
should do if it determines that renewal would not be in the public interest: it must deny renewal. The amendment does not say what the Commission should do if it is unable to make this finding at the hearing.
The answer must be either that it grants a full three-year renewal (despite the fact that it has not been able to make a determination that this
would be in the public interest) or that it grants renewal for a limited
term, hoping that a clearer determination can be made when the matter
comes up again for consideration at the end of the short term. In either
event, the licensee keeps his license until the Commission is able to make
an affirmative determination that renewal would not be in the public
interest. And, since the only person likely to bring adverse evidence
necessary to support such a determination is a party opposing the
licensee, the burden of proof has apparently been shifted. The licensee
has been relieved of the burden of justifying his tenure.
Perhaps this feature of the bill is attributable to poor draftsmanship.
Considering the degree of influence that the NAB exerted in drafting
the amendment,"3 5 however, it is hard not to suspect that the wording
was inserted to protect licensees not only from competing applications
but from petitions to deny. It is less certain that this was the intention
of Senator Pastore or the other supporters of the bill in Congress.
However, even if the bill is interpreted as merely eliminating the
present practice of accepting competing applications, there are other
serious objections to it.
13347 U.S.C. §309(a) (1964).
Even if the Commission grants a short-term
renewal, it must first make an affirmative determination that the renewal would serve
"the public interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U. S. C. § 307(d) (1964).
134

47 U.S.C. § 309(e) (1964).

135 The NAB suggested the "precise legal language" of the bill in letters to its

legislative liaison members. BROADCASTING, April 21, 1969, at 60.
The clause "upon the record and representations of the licensee," which may be
intended to exclude the diversification criterion from the Commission's consideration,
was not included in the NAB's draft of the bill. See note 3 iepra and text accompanying note 114 mtpra. The other difference betveen the Pastore bill and the NAB
draft is that the former states that the Commission "shall" deny the renewal if
renewal would not be in the public interest whereas the NAB version uses the
word "may."
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The petition to deny is a much less effective means of challenge
than the competing application. At the outset, a petitioner must face
a substantial burden of demonstrating in his petition that he has standing
as a party in interest and that a renewal grant would be prima facie
Moreover, in a hearing on
inconsistent with the public interest.'"3
a petition to deny the Commission has no means of determining whether
another person is available who could render better service to the public
in that community. The issue whether the renewal applicant will
serve the public interest is substantially different from the question
37
whether he will serve the public interest better than anyone else.'
Because, under the Pastore bill, the Commission would have no means
of knowing whether other qualified applicants were available in that
community, 3 " it would find it difficult not to accept mediocre programming as in the public interest. In order to deny a renewal application
in such a situation the Commission would almost have to make the
determination that the complete loss of that station to the community
for an indeterminate length of time would be better than having the
present licensee continue." 9 Obviously, the Commission is reluctant to
deny a community a broadcast facility even for a short period of time
unless the station's operation is atrocious. Senator Pastore seemed to
recognize that the standard of performance required of a renewal applicant under his bill would be extremely low when he observed that
for a renewal applicant whose application was denied to submit an
application in the subsequent initial licensing proceedings would be "an
exercise in futility." 140
Thus, the Pastore bill, in its endeavor to promote security in the
broadcasting industry and to avoid irrational decision-making, would
13647 U.S.C. §309(d) (1964).
137 Two decades of experience with the present transfer procedure demonstrate
that the standard of "public interest" is substantially lower where consideration is
limited to one buyer than when anyone can be considered. Since 1952, the FCC has
been prohibited from considering other applications when a licensee desires to sell its
station to another. The sole issue before the Commission is whether the sale to the
particular transferee would be in the public interest. 47 U.S.C. §310(b) (1964).
This loophole in the law has time and again permitted parties who would have no
chance in a comparative hearing to purchase the license from the winner of the
hearing. This procedure has enabled large group owners to acquire the most lucrative
stations in the major markets at the same time that the Commission has been emphasizing diversification in comparative hearings.
138 The Commission could probably assume that acceptable applicants would be
available for VHF and some AM stations in the top ten markets. As to other markets
and as to UHF and FM stations, the Commission would have to speculate.
As in some recent cases, the party filing a petition to deny might indicate whether
he would apply for the station if the license were denied. However, the Commission
would still not know if the petitioner would meet even the FCC's minimal qualifications
or if he could render better service than the licensee.
139 If a license renewal were denied, the community would be denied the service
of that station until a replacement was selected, or at least until the applicants could
commence a cooperative operation-perhaps months or even years later. If the FCC
required the licensee who had already been deemed unsuitable to operate the station for
the interim period, the station's operation would undoubtedly deteriorate from the level
already found inadequate.
140 Transcript of Proceedings, vol. 2, at 143, Hearings on S2004.
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have the effect of protecting licensees rendering mediocre service and
eliminating the most powerful available incentive for better broadcasting.
IV.

CONCLUSION:

AN

ALTERNATIVE TO PROTECTION
OF MEDIOCRITY

Unfortunately, the present political battle over the Pastore bill may
obscure the genuine need to examine the Commission's procedures for
comparative hearings involving renewal applicants. The sequence of
events since WHDH has resulted in a "do or die" confrontation between the two sides. The industry did not foresee any major opposition
to its legislative proposal. To many busy Congressmen seeking to
remain in the good graces of their constituents in the broadcasting industry, it appeared to be only a minor amendment to overrule an
irrational FCC decision. By the time that the opponents of the bill had
rallied enough support to fight effectively against it, hearings had
already begun before a Senate subcommittee which overwhelmingly
favored the bill. Thus the immediate and pressing concern of the
opponents of the bill was to defeat it. On the other hand, the proponents of the bill, fearing that its defeat might be interpreted as Congressional approval of the WHDH decision, have tended to concentrate
all their efforts on securing its passage. Development of a viable
Commission procedure has thus necessarily taken second place with both
the bill's opponents and proponents. Hopefully the Congressional hearings will focus on more constructive legislation. This Comment offers
a proposal to meet the problem posed by WHDH-excessive insecurity
in the broadcasting industry resulting from exposure of renewal applicants to comparative hearings in the absence of reliable standards. 4 '
141 A legislative alternative to the Pastore bill has been proposed in The FCC
and Broadcasting License Renewals: Perspectives on WHDH, 36 U. Ci. L. Rxv.

854, 876-82 (1969). The author proposes that the license term be extended to six
years, but that challenges be permitted after the first three years of the term. If, in
the mid-term comparative hearing, the challenger were considered superior to the
licensee, the Commission would advise the licensee of his comparative weaknesses and
allow him three years to correct them. The challenger could compete again in a
comparative hearing with the licensee after the three year "probationary period" but
he would not be permitted to alter his application for the better. If in the second
comparative hearing the challenger was still considered superior, he would be granted
the license.
The proposal is noteworthy if only because it recognizes two of the major difficulties with the WHDH policy: the unnecessary insecurity to the broadcaster and
the absence of standards by which he can guide his performance. However, in so far
as it deals with the crucial element of performance, the proposal virtually immunizes
the licensee from the threat of loss of license and thereby deters competing applicants.
Unless the challenged licensee lacked the financial resources, which would be extremely
unlikely among the larger stations in the major markets, he would outperform the
challenger's proposals in the three-year "probationary period" even if he had to incur
a substantial loss. Afterwards, when the threat was removed, he would be free to
relapse into his old ways. Furthermore, the tremendous expense of two comparative
hearings and court appeals, not to mention the long delay between the initial challenge
and the final award of the license, would be a great obstacle to competing applicants.
Even if the licensee held a virtual monopoly of the mass media in a city, he could
probably sell the license to the challenger at a handsome price because of the tremendous obstacles facing the challenger in the FCC proceedings.
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The proposal is based on certain assumptions which are reasonable
if not empirically demonstrable. First, reasonable competition among
licensees and between them and potential applicants to provide service to
their community is in the interest of the viewing public. Second, it
makes sense to utilize competing applications to help the Commission
determine which licensees are not fulfilling their obligations to their
communities. Third, the public interest is better served by displacing
stations providing poorer service than by displacing those providing
better service. 4 Fourth, a renewal applicant should be judged primarily on his past broadcast record unless other factors would warrant
Commission consideration in the absence of a competing application.
Fifth, the standards for evaluating past performance of a renewal applicant must be as definite as possible to protect him from detrimental
reliance, surprise, and irrational decision-making.'3
Under the proposal, the comparative hearing procedure would be
divided into two parts in cases involving renewal applicants. The initial
issue before both the hearing examiner and the Commission would be
solely whether the renewal applicant has demonstrated by his past performance an unusual attention to the needs and interests of the public.
Although the competing applicant's proposals would not be considered
in this initial phase of the proceeding, he would be a full party to it and
would have the right to introduce evidence bearing on the adequacy of
the renewal applicant's past performance. The initial determination of
the level of the renewal applicant's record would be made by a comparison with other similar 14 stations in the market.145 If the renewal
142 Although this assumption seems to be too obvious to require mention,
an argument can be made that the displacement of the best stations in a market by
competing applicants better serves the public interest than the displacement of the
worst stations. The argument has two parts. First, the best performing station sets
the level of performance for all stations in the market. Thus, by raising the level of
performance of the best station, the overall performance level of all stations will be
improved. Second, competing applicants which challenge badly performing stations
will propose programming which will be similar to or not significantly above the
caliber of programming of the average stations in the market, since it is in the
challenger's self-interest not to promise more than is necessary to obtain the license.
The validity of these contentions is open to considerable doubt as general propositions, although they may be true in particular circumstances. However, even if the
argument is correct, it seems totally nonsensical to build a competitive system in which
the best performers are those most likely to lose their licenses. Other means are
available to induce stations to raise the level of their performance such as the ranking
outlined in the proposal.
system
43
1 See text accompanying notes 127 & 128 supra.
As a political fact, definite standards are necessary in comparative hearings
involving renewal applicants if the Commission is to function effectively. Nothing
would bring Congressional pressure to bear on the Commission faster than irrational
decisions in which renewal applicants were ousted. And, if history is a reliable indicator of the future, the possibility of some unsupportable decisions must be considered
and guarded against by the Commission itself.
144The comparison should be between stations of similar types-VHF, UHF,
AM, or FM. Furthermore, stations with unique problems or in unique circumstances
should not be considered in the comparison. For example, a year-old station that is in
financial straits should not be compared with well-established, prosperous ones.
145 The FCC in its financial reports has designated which stations are in each
market for at least the top 100 markets. Because all licenses in a state expire on the
same date, current data on stations in the particular market would be available to the
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applicant ranked in the top third of the comparable stations in the
market under the FCC ranking system (discussed below 14), the burden
of proof would be on the competing applicant to demonstrate that the
station's ranking did not accurately indicate its past performance, or that
factors 1417 other than past performance were so important that they must
be considered before renewing the license. If the renewal applicant
ranked in the bottom two-thirds of the stations in its market, the renewal applicant would have the burden of demonstrating that it had
in fact rendered better service than any other station in the market. 148
The hearing examiner's decision on the past performance issue would
be appealable by either party to the Commission. If the Commission
found that the renewal applicant ranked in the top third of the stations
in its market and that a grant of the renewal would be in the public
interest, 149 the Commission would renew the license. 5 ' If, on the other
hand, the Commission found that the renewal applicant had not demonstrated an exceptional record of performance compared with the other
Commission, except in the few situations in which the market encompasses different

states.
146 See text accompanying notes 155-159 infra.
147 Issues relating to the public interest determination, but not encompassed in the

past broadcast record criterion, should also be designated for hearing at this stage.
These issues might include allegations of false advertising, deliberate slanting or
staging of the news, racial discrimination in employment, anticompetitive business
practices, and failure to comply with Commission regulations and procedures, to mention only a few. Resolution of these noncomparative issues at an early stage may
avoid a long hearing process, particularly if the Commission finds that the renewal
applicant should be disqualified as a party for violation of an FCC regulation or policy.
Demerits for any conclusion adverse to the renewal applicant on a noncomparative
issue obviously should be weighed in selecting the best applicant in the second phase
of the hearing.
148 Any rating system can provide only a superficial analysis of the past performance of stations in a market. And even that analysis may be incorrect because
the information from which the ratings are compiled is incorrect. Therefore, the
renewal applicant must be allowed to demonstrate that those aspects of its past broadcast record on which it was superior to the other stations in the market, and which
were not considered in the ratings, are important and should be considered by the
Commission in determining whether the licensee's past performance was exceptional.
In this manner, gross differences in quality of programming between stations and in
responsiveness to the needs of the community can be introduced into the evaluation
of the licensee's past performance. Also, the parties to the hearing should be permitted to show that the information on which the rating was based is incorrect.
149 An affirmative finding that renewal would be in the public interest would still
be required so that stations with high ratings which had violated FCC policies or
regulations, or concerning which there were unresolved questions of fact, would not
be automatically renewed.
150 The proposal is similar to the proposal of Lawrence Grossman before the
Pastore Subcommittee, except that the Grossman plan would require the hearing
examiner to hold a full comparative hearing even if he found the licensee's performance to be outstanding. See Transcript of Proceedings, vol. 3, at 394-95, Hearings
on S.2004. The difficulties of the Grossman proposal are two-fold. First, consideration
of the standard comparative issues after a licensee has shown a record of unusual
attention to the needs of the community may well be a waste of time and money.
Second, licensees would fear that the Commission might look beyond the issue of the
licensee's past performance and consider evidence on other comparative criteria contained in the hearing record in making its determination on the past performance issue.
This difficulty might not turn out to be serious, but the proposal in the text would
at least provide a procedural safeguard against Commission consideration of evidence
unrelated to past performance. It would also make judicial review considerably
easier and more effective.
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stations in its market or if it found that there were other unresolved
issues which should be explored in a comparative hearing,' 5 ' it would
remand the case to the hearing examiner for a regular comparative
hearing. If the Commission determined that the past record of performance was exceptionally poor, it would remand to the hearing examiner
with the direction that he confer a demerit on the renewal applicant on
the past broadcast record criterion. On remand, the hearing examiner
would not consider the criterion of past broadcast record unless it had
been found to be exceptionally poor. The renewal applicant would be
permitted, however, to introduce evidence of its past programming to
demonstrate the practicality and credibility of its proposed programming. It would also have an opportunity to use its record to demonstrate that the separation of ownership from day-to-day control had not
adversely affected the station's operation and performance. If the competing applicant were granted the license, it would be required to
purchase the ex-licensee's facilities for the fair market value of the
tangible property and to assume some of the long-term obligations as
the Commission required.'
The two-step hearing process recognizes that the best indicator of
future performance is the renewal applicant's broadcast record, but that
it should only be given significance if that record is exceptionally good
or exceptionally poor. If the record is exceptionally good, there is little
reason to subject the licensee to a comparative hearing. Not only
would it probably be fruitless, but, in most cases, the only criteria on
53
which a challenger could win would be integration and diversificationY.
If these criteria were determinative, there would be less reason for
most licensees in the major markets to attempt to improve their programming. Their best interest would lie in making as much money as
possible before they were challenged. As noted earlier, 5 ' it would be
more rational and equitable for the Commission to deal with the concentration of control problem through its rulemaking powers by requiring divestiture, than by making it the determinative criterion in
the comparative hearing.
Concededly, a competing applicant might be able to demonstrate
that he would render better service than any station in a particular
market. It is also possible that all the stations in a particular market
151 In passing upon the hearing examiner's evaluation of the renewal applicant's

record of past performance, the Commission could also designate issues for hearing
which had not been satisfactorily resolved in the first stage of the hearing or which
had not been previously requested to be set for hearing by the parties. Permitting the
parties to request that certain issues be designated for hearing half way through the
hearing process might diminish the delay in the start of hearings caused by innumerable
requests for the designation of issues.
152 Beside long-term obligations associated with tangible property such as mortgages, the Commission might require that the victorious competing applicant keep
the non-managerial personnel of the station and assume contracts for future programming which could be worked into the new licensee's program schedule.
See p. 390 supra.
154See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
'53
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are mediocre or poor by any standard. Why, then, automatically protect one licensee in each market? First, it is assumed that the replacement of the stations in a market rendering the worst service to the
public serves the public interest more than the replacement of the best
stations. Second, the protection of the best licensee could act as an
incentive to existing stations to compete for the top rating. Thus,
assuming that most stations in the major markets would view the
threat of competing applications as real, another element of competition
would be injected into the regulatory scheme.
It must be recognized that the key to the rational development of
the WHDH policy is the evolution of a definite set of standards with
which to evaluate a renewal applicant's past broadcast record. The
aspects of a licensee's record with which the Commission is concerned
have hitherto been only vaguely defined. And the Commission has not
consistently applied even these limited standards in initial licensing
cases. ' Such standards may be tolerable, although not desirable, in
initial licensing cases where large investments are not at stake. But
definite standards on which existing licensees can rely must be promulgated if "regulation by competing application" is to evolve into more
than a haphazard method of arbitrarily alternating licensees in the top
markets. The Commission has already enumerated those aspects of
past performance which it considers important in its renewal application
form and in its various policy statements. 5 6 It is suggested that at
least until the Commission can develop a better set of standards to serve
as an adequate basis for prediction, it enumerate the quantitative criteria
it deems most important in evaluating a record of past performance, and
indicate the relative weight it attributes to those criteria, 5" thereby providing a frame of reference by which broadcasters in a market can be
Such a quantitative comparison of stations would elimcompared."
1S5See notes 126 & 127 supra & accompanying text.
56
1 See, e.g., Public Notice Relating to Ascertainment of Community Needs by
Broadcast Applicants (FCC 68-847), 33 Fed. Reg. 12113, 13 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1903
(1968) ; Report and Statement of Policy Re: Commission En Banc Programming
Inquiry (FCC 60-970), 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 20 P & F RADIO REG. 1902 (1960) ; Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
157 Since some aspects of a renewal applicant's record are more important in deter-

mining the level of his past performance than others, a high rating on one might be
given twice the weight in the final computation that is given to other aspects of the
record. Also, certain programs within each category could be weighted more heavily
than others. For example, an hour of non-entertainment programming in prime time
might be given the weight of two hours of non-prime time programming.
158 The rating system envisioned is similar to that employed by the INsTIuTE FOR
POLICY STUDIES IN TELEVISiON TODAY: THE END OF COMMUNICATION AND THE DEATH
94-198 (1969), and by Commissioner Johnson in Renewal of Radio and
Television Licenses in New York and New Jersey, 18 F.C.C2d 268 (1969), except
that the comparison would be limited to a market and would not encompass an entire
state or region.
The most complete analysis of station performance is contained in the Institute
for Policy Studies (IPS) report. It ranked the 32 television stations in the MarylandVirginia-West Virginia-District of Columbia region in two ways: performance during
the composite week in 1969, and improvement in performance from 1963 to 1969. The
OF COMMUNITY,

former ranking was compiled by rating each station in nine categories: percentage of

news programming, percentage of public affairs programming, percentage of entertain-
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inate the major difficulty in setting and implementing standards-determining what will be deemed above average.
Of course, quantitative standards are poor measures of performance, except to the extent that a low amount of non-entertainment
programming demonstrates that even if all such programs are of excellent quality, the broadcast record should not be deemed exceptional.
But even if quantitative standards would not show whether the licensee
played the game well, it would at least indicate whether he played
the game.' 9
ment programming (the higher the percentage, the lower the rank), the percentage of
locally-oriented programming, the hours of locally-originated prime time programming,
the ratio of local and regional news to total news, the ratio of news employees to total
employees, the number of public service announcements, and the percentage of 60
minute segments with over 12 minutes of commercials. The ranking on each of these
categories was then totaled and the total score normalized (stated as a percentage of
the highest possible score). The IPS study also compared the normalized score with
the station's 30 minute advertising rate (which was used to indicate station size).
Some of the mechanics of the IPS study have been questioned in the Resource
Management Corporation report which is included in the Evening Star Broadcasting
Company's Brief in Opposition to the Petition to Deny (FCC File No. BRCT-23).
The major fault of the IPS study, which is based on programming classifications made
by licensees on their renewal applications, is that the FCC definitions of types of
programming are so vague that the same or similar programs are often classified
differently by different stations. This fault could be alleviated were the Commission
in subsequent cases to review licensees' classifications so that licensees would know
how most network and syndicated programming should be classified and would have
more definite standards by which to classify their locally-originated programs. Accurate classification is the basis of any quantitative measure of performance.
Many of the other criticisms of the IPS study by the RMC report would be met
by a rating system in which only comparable stations in the particular market were
compared. Since the stations would have broadcast days of similar length, it would
usually make little difference whether the amount of programming was stated in total
hours or as a percentage of the broadcast day. Furthermore, there would be less need
to find a means of weighting performance to deal with major differences in station
size. The RMC report appears to support the ranking system proposed here because,
with all the adjustment it makes to eliminate the flaws in the IPS study, it still ranks
WMAL-TV below every other VHF station in the Washington market by a significant
margin and below all but one comparable station in the Baltimore market (one Baltimore station is considerably smaller than the other stations).
19 If the mechanics of the ranking system were set forth in detail by the Commission and if the categories were such that necessary information for all stations
in a market could be readily obtained (e.g., from newspaper and TV Guide program
listings), each station would be able to ascertain its approximate rank at any given
point in time and adapt its performance accordingly. Admittedly, this alone cannot
guarantee quality. But if licensees were induced to devote more of their time to other
than superficial entertainment programming, other factors might induce them to improve the quality of their programming. For example, stations might be able to secure
advertisers for non-entertainment programming if it were of consistently good quality
and if it could be competitive with the programs of rival stations. Recently, many
broadcasters have discovered that local news programming can be extremely profitable.
As one trade magazine observed:
With its high male adult viewership, appeal to high-income audiences and
its "quality" image, news can command a higher per minute [advertising] rate
than just about any show on the air, save football or Laugh-Ilt.
TELEViSI N AGE, Sept. 22, 1969, at 28. A study of 30 markets found that the most
popular local news program had a higher audience rating than either the NBC or
CBS network news program in 19 of the markets. Id. at 60.
Another factor encouraging broadcasters to present non-entertainment programming of more than mediocre quality is the "audience flow" phenomenon. Studies show
that as much as 609o of a viewing audience will continue to watch the same channel
after a program is over.

Soc='y 59 (1957).

SELDEs, THE NEW MAss MIEDiA: CHALLENGE TO A FREE

Thus, the larger the audience that a station or network can build
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The proposed procedure is also designed to induce prospective
competing applicants to bring before the Commission a much more
intensive analysis of the performance of stations in a market than the
FCC could undertake. The better the performance of the station challenged, the more complete that analysis would have to be, since the
challenger would either have to show that a top ranking was not
indicative of the licensee's performance or have to face the possibility
that a licensee with a lower rating might demonstrate that the rating
system was inaccurate or failed to reflect the high quality of the licensee's
programming. As far as the competing applicant is concerned, the
procedure alters the post-WHDH situation very little in practice, since
most competing applicants are now analyzing the market and challenging
the worst stations. 60
Neither does the proposal change post-WHDH law with regard to
renewal applicants who do not have superior records. A record of past
performance which is not superior to that of other stations in the market
certainly increases the probability that a competing applicant might be
able to demonstrate that he can better serve the community. Like
WHDH, the proposal recognizes that past performance cannot be
ignored when the criterion of proposed programming is being considered. Unlike WHDH, the proposal permits past operation to be
considered to some extent in relation to integration of ownership and
management. This use of the record does not accord an average
licensee an unfair advantage. It merely recognizes the fact that a
licensee's programming proposals are more credible if similar to its past
programming, and that a competing applicant's superiority on integration does not necessarily mean that he will operate the station more
responsibly or will be more attentive to the needs and interests of his
community than the renewal applicant. In one way the "average"
licensee's situation would be changed. The assurance that rival stations
were competing for high rankings in the market would remove some
of the present disincentives to invest in improved programming. Thus,
up before a particular program, the more valuable that program is to the advertiser.
Consequently, when non-entertainment or locally-originated programs precede other
programs, particularly in prime time, it is competitively advantageous for the broadcaster to present programs that are popular. Of course, popularity and quality are not
synonymous. However, it is doubtful that consistently poor quality programs can build
up a viewing audience. And something is to be said for the proposition that high
quality is meaningless if few people watch the program.
A final factor which would induce quality programming is the likelihood that
that a station which revises its programming in order to obtain the highest rating
might find itself placed below another station in the market in the final rankings.
Thus, the financial sacrifice involved in competing for the top ranking would be for
naught unless the licensee could demonstrate to the Commission that, although it
was second-best in quantity, it was far superior to the other stations in quality and
meaningful programming.
160 Of the principal stations which have been challenged, most are unquestionably
inferior to the other stations in their market. Thus, KHJ in Los Angeles, WNAC
in Boston, and WPIX in New York, all have less non-entertainment programming
than most other comparable stations in their markets.
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even if its relative position in the market remained unchanged, its actual
performance would improve, and it would be less vulnerable to challenge.
Cooperation between the Congress and the Commission is required
to utilize the full potential of the policy of WHDH, not only because
legislation might be required to implement the two-step procedure 161
and Commission action is necessary to establish standards, but also
because, without consultation, each body is likely to frustrate the scheme
of the other. The Pastore bill demonstrates how little communication
there is between the Commission and Congress, and how little Congress
really understands the intricacies of broadcast regulation. The Commission's history shows that it will not act until it finds itself in a crisis
situation unless Congress compels it to act. This state of affairs is
understandable in view of the great progress and expansion of the entire
communications industry. But both the Congress and the Commission
must recognize that stations, principally VHF stations, in the largest
markets are today and will be for the immediate future the main source
of news, information, and entertainment for the overwhelming majority
of the American people. 6 '
There are two possible consequences of VHDH-regulation by
competition or automatic renewal. The choice is presently before
Congress. It is a choice between continuing tolerance of mediocrity
and new incentives to responsible broadcasting.
William H. Wentz
-1 Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945) might be interpreted
as requiring a full comparative hearing no matter how excellent the renewal applicant's
performance may be. Actually, the comparative hearing was the FCC's response to
the decision in Ashbacker requiring that when mutually exclusive applications were
filed, both parties had a right to a hearing. Since the comparative hearing is the
FCC's own creation, it should be able to modify the hearing procedure to further its
regulatory policies, at least if both applicants are permitted to participate in the
hearing.
132 Almost 75% of all the television homes in the country are located in the top
50 markets and approximately 90% are in the top 100. Trask, The Palace of Humbug
-A Study of FCC Policies Relating to Group Ownership of Television Stations, 22

FED. Comm. BJ. 185, 199 (1968).

